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INTRODUCTION 
If you are working in child protection or child welfare making 
decisions that affect children, young people and their families, or 
deciding how to organise the local child welfare system, or what 
programmes to provide in your area, this book is intended for you. 
It aims to help you deliberate about what you should do to predict 
more reliably the outcomes of interventions you might be 
considering and to recognise what evidence you will need for these 
tasks and how judgement is central to doing them well. Our 
discussion grows out of systematic research and scholarship but 
this is no scholarly tome. It aims to be of help to real practitioners 
and managers making real decisions about real children and young 
people and wanting to think about how to do this better. 
“Evidence” in general usage, including in welfare services, means 
information that is used to provide support for a conclusion. When 
social workers form judgements on children’s safety, they draw on 
a wide range of evidence as they think and reflect on what to do. 
This may include some information from research but this forms – 
and should form – only a small part of the total evidence. They 
may also draw on what they themselves have seen and heard, on 
their local knowledge, on theories, on observations that others, 
including family members, have reported to them and on the 
opinions of others. All of these become “evidence” when used to 
support a conclusion. Consider a court report prepared on a 
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family: it will cite many types of information to justify its decisions 
about which course of action is in the best interests of the child 
and, in this context, all of these types of information operate as 
evidence.  
Whether it is evidence is not an intrinsic property of any piece of 
information. It only becomes “evidence” when someone decides 
that it is relevant to their deliberations. Researchers have found 
that folic acid reduces the incidence of spina bifida, but this is not 
evidence if you are arguing for anger management classes for 
abusive men.  
Therefore, the notion that there can be an “evidence bank” – a 
neutral body of evidence sitting in folders in computers or on 
websites – is misguided. There can be resources that capture a 
body of research that those making the selection have deemed 
might be relevant to policy makers and practitioners in children’s 
services. But any of these studies only become “evidence” when a 
user judges them relevant to their purposes. 
This discussion of what constitutes evidence and where it can 
come from offers a radically different picture from that seen in 
current accounts of Evidence-based Policy and Practice (EBPP). 
This movement is now receiving strong political support for its 
efforts to increase the role of research in policy-making and 
practice. In the UK, for example, the Government has established 
several What Works Centres to collate and disseminate research 
deemed relevant to different policy areas such as early 
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intervention in children’s lives, education and criminal justice, and 
a new centre is now planned for research relevant to social work. 
In the US, federal government funding is given to interventions 
that have qualified to be called “evidenced”.  In EBPP, the term 
“evidence” is typically reserved for describing the findings of 
empirical research and they are given the label as if it described 
an intrinsic, enduring quality. This misuse of the term takes the 
EBPP movement onto a narrow path that distances it from the 
reality in which practitioners and policy-makers in child welfare 
make decisions on what to do. We shall offer a better 
understanding of the role of research within the practical context 
of deciding and acting, showing how it can play an important, yet 
minor, role in the whole context in which people are working. 
People turn to empirical research because they see the rigour of 
scientific methods as contributing more reliable knowledge for 
welfare services. Nothing in this book should be read as 
disagreeing with this view. The disagreement lies in the size and 
the nature of the contribution that science can make. Indeed, the 
EBPP literature seems to have an even narrower focus than 
empirical research. It has become mainly interested in evaluative 
studies – “Did this intervention have a causal impact?” – and in 
how to appraise the reliability and validity of their findings. Many 
accept a “hierarchy of evidence” where some methods are deemed 
to produce more reliable findings, giving high value to randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs) (where the results for the experimental 
group are compared with those of a randomly created control 
group who have not received the service being tested). The top 
Improving child safety 
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place in the hierarchy is typically given to systematic reviews of 
RCTs.  
This focus on evaluation distracts attention from the many other 
types of research questions that are of interest to people in child 
welfare services, including “What tends to happen to people who 
experience this problem?” (the natural history of social problems) 
or “What is it like to receive this intervention?” (understanding the 
experience of the users of services).  
How should research be used?  
Another preoccupation of the EBPP movement is with how to 
persuade policy-makers and practitioners to use the studies they 
have judged sound to inform their decisions on what to do. But, 
we think, insufficient attention is given to the questions “How 
should policy-makers and practitioners use research?” and “How 
can research help them make better decisions?” Rather than 
starting from the position of researchers trying to convince others 
of the value of their contribution, we seek to put ourselves in the 
position of those who make decisions and take actions to promote 
the safety and welfare of children. What role should research play 
for them? 
The EBPP movement aims to make the task of using research 
easier by providing appraisals of the quality of studies (and hence 
of the confidence we can have in their findings) and by 
disseminating findings that may be of interest to others. Much of 
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the work can be seen as attempting to simplify the process of 
using research findings. Simplification is an admirable aim if it is 
achievable without loss but the efforts of EBPP may promise more 
than the research results can provide alone. The dangers are 
twofold. First, a failure to deal with the complexity of causality 
increases the risk of exposing families to ineffective and potentially 
harmful interventions as well as increasing the risk of wasting 
money. Second, insufficient attention gets paid to the crucial role 
of deliberation in making judgements and decisions. This risks 
deliberation being undervalued so that time and support for it is 
given low priority in busy professional lives, which in turn leads to 
poor quality practice.  
Let us first consider the complexity of the causal processes at work 
in children’s safety and well-being. Families are not machines and 
intervening in their lives has numerous repercussions, both good 
and bad, intended and unintended. Therefore, there is no simple 
way to use research to make predictions about what will happen 
nor a simple way of administering a social intervention. We think 
that, sadly, making predictions about what will happen in a specific 
family or group of families requires far more work from policy-
makers and practitioners than the current EBPP narrative 
suggests. They need to do their own research: gather facts about 
their case and use them to make well-grounded conjectures about 
what is going on and what might happen under various courses of 
action. They will also need to find a way to grapple with the 
complex and open causal processes that will determine what 
happens.  
Improving child safety 
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This reasoning can be done in better or worse ways but it cannot 
be done by formula or by rote. It requires deliberation.  
The role of deliberation 
EBPP does acknowledge that there is a role for deliberation in that 
the “best evidence” from research is seen as just one variable for 
the decision maker to use. It needs to be combined with the 
professional’s local knowledge and the user’s preferences in the 
deliberative process (Sackett, 1996). However, we argue that its 
role is bigger than this. The issue is not just that you cannot 
decide to take a well-evidenced policy or practice off the shelf and 
apply it to a family based on the research evidence alone: you 
cannot take it off the shelf and assume that it will work for you. To 
put it differently, you cannot be certain that when it interacts with 
other factors in your context it will have the desired effects – no 
matter how well evidenced it is that the policy has worked 
sometimes.  
Much of the EBPP literature appears to assume a simple, linear 
view of causal processes, leading to the assumption that if 
research has shown that “it” works in an RCT then it will work 
elsewhere, or at least this is the default position failing good 
reasons to the contrary.  Hence the popularity of titles What works 
in .... A closer look at the nature of causality shows that this 
assumption must be rejected. External validity – whether the 
results of the study will apply elsewhere – is generally 
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acknowledged as a problem but most of the discussion of this is 
too restricted. You are often told that you will need to judge that 
your context is sufficiently like the one of the RCT. “Sufficiently 
like” is, however, a challenging judgement to make when working 
in the social world. Let us list some of the complications. 
First, many of the key terms in social research are socially 
constructed and so vary over time and between contexts. So 
judgement needs to be made about whether the language of the 
RCT is sufficiently like your own. Does “mother”, for example, 
have the same connotations? To cite one real-life example, a good 
post hoc evaluation showed that educating mothers about the 
nutritional value of food led to improved diet of children in Tamil 
Nadu. Expecting this result to hold elsewhere relies on the hidden 
assumption that mothers buy the food or influence what is bought 
and how it is distributed in the family, which may be true in Tamil 
Nadu but does not hold true in all cultures as was shown when the 
intervention was used unsuccessfully in Bangladesh. (For further 
discussion of this case see Cartwright and Hardie, 2012).  
Second, researchers need to hypothesize about how to describe 
the “it” that they are studying. Considering all the details of what 
was done in providing a service or implementing a policy, what 
needs to be written down as relevant and what can be omitted? 
This cannot be done by simple observation. It requires conjectures 
about which aspects of what is done have causal significance. 
Manuals can capture much of the process of providing an 
intervention but they omit numerous aspects of the work that was 
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actually done in the RCT. They might, for instance, choose not to 
mention the day of the week the family was seen in a family 
therapy intervention because they did not consider it significant. 
However, this detail can be significant. It seems that it does 
matter if reporting an intervention to reduce recidivism among 
prisoners released from jail. Those who are released on Fridays 
tend to get into trouble at once over the weekend if the support 
systems are not available, so the day of contact then matters.  
Third, there is a limit to how much can be described and 
prescribed in a manual. Work with families is influenced by factors 
in the individual workers and family members. While there is a 
dispute about the strength of the influence, there is general 
agreement that therapist characteristics have an impact on the 
effectiveness of any intervention. Equally, there is general 
agreement that families vary in their willingness or ability to 
engage with an intervention. So when reading the research, 
attention has to be given to the features of these groups. And 
social workers must decide whether, if they were to use the 
intervention, they would be able to replicate them. The more 
information the research teams give about which features they 
think are causally relevant, the easier the task for the users. 
The fourth and final type of complication that causal processes 
create relates to using an intervention in a new context: any new 
policy or practice, once implemented, interacts with other features 
of the environment and this can lead to unexpected and unwanted 
consequences. ‘Social interventions are complex systems thrust 
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into complex systems’ (Pawson, 2006 p.35). The Munro Review of 
Child Protection (Munro, 2011), for example, showed how 
intelligently designed reforms that were sensible solutions to 
specific problems interacted to produce over time a system that 
was more and more driven by a blame and compliance culture, an 
outcome that was both unintended and undesirable.  
The way the intervention interacts with the features of a new 
context creates a challenge for the concept of fidelity to the model. 
Much EBPP literature urges this: do just what was done in the test 
and don’t deviate. There are good reasons for that. First, it is only 
that intervention, done just that way, that has been rigorously 
tested. Second, there is always the temptation to deviate from the 
model – to take short cuts in various ways, to save money and 
effort, to hurry for more immediate outcomes, to use less 
experienced workers – and this can severely jeopardise success. 
But there is also a very good reason against fidelity: contexts 
differ and interventions have to be responsive to this. Very often 
interventions that might well work in a new setting with 
adjustments to local circumstances will fail miserably if 
implemented just as they were in the trial. 
A complex view of causality fits with the uneven and inconsistent 
results that are found in evaluations of policy and practice. The 
headline findings generally report average results but behind the 
average are a range of results for individuals and families, with 
some showing little improvement and some actually getting worse. 
Multisystemic therapy, for instance, has been tested in several 
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RCTs in many countries and not only has differing results in the 
overall conclusion of whether it was better than other interventions 
but also, within the studies reporting effectiveness, there is no 
consistent set of variables on which progress is found (Littell, 
2006). 
The first chapter of this book explores these complicated issues 
about causality and provides some guidance on how to make more 
reliable predictions about what will work for the family you are 
working with. It will also stress that even doing it as well as you 
can and with the best use of research evidence possible, predicting 
what will happen when you intervene is a dicey matter so it is 
crucial to monitor for when things are not going as hoped for. The 
discussion in Chapter 1 highlights the importance of reasoning 
processes – of how we deliberate, which forms the second key 
theme of this book. 
Deliberation is a core skill in life and professional practice, yet 
nowadays it gets little explicit attention in discussions of reasoning 
skills in professional practice or in discussions of EBPP. This was 
not always the case. It has been a major preoccupation of 
philosophers since the ancient Greeks. Discussion of “deliberation” 
goes back to Aristotle, who uses βούλευσις (bouleusis) to refer to 
the process which we are setting out here. Both the English and 
the Greek term are very broad. They refer to the process of 
thinking about, reflecting on, whatever it is that you need to 
consider if you are to make a good decision. The process is far 
reaching and open-ended, drawing on a variety of skills and a 
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variety of kinds of evidence and other considerations. Many 
working in child welfare will see that we are talking about a 
process that is familiar to them although the way we talk about it 
may be novel. Indeed, talking about it explicitly may be novel.  
The relationship between deliberation and deciding and acting is 
what perhaps most closely defines deliberation and contrasts it 
with general thinking. Deliberation is thinking that addresses a 
decision or action. Although deliberation is directed towards 
deciding, it is not solely to do with what has come to be called 
“decision-making”, nor with following the rules and protocols that 
control much professional practice in child welfare and elsewhere. 
Deliberation ends with decisions about what to do. But the 
character of this sort of decision-making is open-textured, it is not 
logical in the sense of having a formal procedure leading to one 
“correct” answer. But, as we shall attempt to show, it is not 
therefore all over the place. It is not true that in deliberating, 
anything goes because it has no formal logic.  
Even when conclusions have been reached about the likely causal 
impact of an intervention, deliberation is needed to consider 
whether the intervention ought to be implemented since there is 
always a moral dimension to intervening in others’ lives. And 
attention should be given to the views and preferences of the 
families receiving the intervention. Welfare services deal 
disproportionately with the poorest and least powerful members of 
society and practitioners generally want to avoid adding to their 
oppression. So deliberation is needed to weigh their contribution in 
Improving child safety 
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the balance with the contributions from research and the 
practitioner or policy-maker’s own local knowledge.  
Thus the two key themes of this book are understanding causal 
processes and how to deliberate to improve the quality of help 
provided to children, young people and their families. 
Can we really do without deliberation? 
Our interest in the role of deliberation and professional judgement 
is, in many ways, out of step with the times. The defensive and 
compliance culture that was identified in the Munro Review has 
contributed to a culture that seeks to reform practice in child 
welfare by providing rules and decision aids and by diminishing the 
role of individual expertise and reasoning as much as possible. In 
child protection services, this is very well illustrated by the way 
that reviews into child deaths tend to conclude that human error 
was to blame and then make recommendations that seek to 
reduce the role of human judgement (Munro, 2005). Rose and 
Barnes (2008), in their report of serious case reviews, note the 
priority given to procedures as the mechanism for improving 
practice: 
What was marked was the emphasis in the recommendations 
on reviewing or strengthening existing procedures or 
developing new procedures. This was supported by the views 
of some of the respondents that the systems were adequate 
but the problem was one of staff compliance. There was less 
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emphasis than might have been expected on issues of 
management, supervision, staffing resources and staff 
knowledge, skills and experience. The organisational context, 
which in some agencies at the time was undergoing major 
change, resulting in disruption and discontinuity in staffing, 
also rarely featured in issues to be addressed (2008, 88). 
Another example of the current trend of limiting or undervaluing 
the role of individual reasoning can be seen in EBPP itself. Its 
original formulation, based on Evidence-based Medicine, saw 
individual professionals drawing on best evidence from research as 
one strand in their reasoning leading to a decision on what action 
to take. However, increasingly, the term “evidence-based” is being 
attached to specific interventions that have shown some positive 
findings in one or more RCTs and, often, a practice is called 
“evidence-based” if it uses one of these interventions. This 
conveys the misleading impression that research can make the 
biggest decisions for you about what to do to help children: you 
can just consult one of the resources that will list “what works” for 
the problem that concerns you.  
Replacing individual judgement with rules is a sensible strategy if 
you are dealing with an area of work where there is one clear, 
uncontroversial way to achieve your goals that can be spelled out 
in an instruction manual. If you are trying to mend a washing 
machine, then the rule “Put this replacement motor in to solve 
problem X” may work very well. However, in child welfare we are 
dealing with a very different context. The causal processes 
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between what the professional does and the impact on the child 
are very complex, so attention has to be given to the specific 
circumstances of the situation in deciding what to do. For example, 
consider the general principle “Seek to understand the child’s point 
of view.” This rule is formulated at a high level of abstraction. 
Because the abilities and needs of children are so varied, following 
the rule in practice requires a professional to draw on skills and 
knowledge to decide how best to achieve this with a particular 
child. 
One motivation in writing this book is a concern that those 
encouraging the use of research may repeat the mistake seen in 
numerous reforms of child welfare services:  over-estimating how 
much policy and practice can be rule-based and proceduralised 
and thus under-estimating the importance of the individual’s skill 
in deciding how to use findings from research. The simplicity of 
having a set of rules to follow is beguiling but judgement, i.e. 
thinking that goes beyond mere rule-following, is needed in 
deciding how to use research just as it is needed in practice 
generally. We are dealing with complicated scenarios where rules 
cannot capture all that has to be taken into account.  
Outline 
Our book consists of two main chapters. Chapter 1 looks at the 
reasoning involved in deciding whether a tested intervention will 
work for you. It examines the implications a non-linear view of 
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causality has for deciding which research findings are useful to 
you, in what ways they can be useful and some of the other things 
you need to know in order to use them effectively. If causality is 
complex, then there are serious limits to our ability to predict 
future human behaviour and hence to our ability to know what will 
happen if we choose one course of action over another. This 
limited predictability is disconcerting to those who are hoping to 
find “what works” so that they can do the same. It is also 
disconcerting to those who think that sensible use of research 
results can provide a high level of certainty.  
But this limitation should not be taken as a reason for despair: we 
are able to make some tentative predictions that some options are 
a better bet. Moreover, understanding the interacting causal 
processes that will affect the outcomes of our actions encourages 
us to ask more questions of research. The research websites can 
tell you that an intervention worked in one or more places where it 
was evaluated, but the potential user needs to ask a number of 
critical questions to put this information to use: if it works there, in 
the study population, will it work here? If it will, what will it take to 
get it to work here and how can we find out what it will take? If we 
have reason to think it won’t, are there still useful lessons for us to 
be drawn from the research? How do we find other kinds of well-
accredited information that can help us? 
This issue is familiar to many in child welfare who are aware that 
you cannot simply transport research findings about a policy or 
practice from one place to another. The problem is noticeable in 
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terms of using findings from the US, where the majority of current 
RCTs have been conducted, in other countries with very different 
welfare systems and cultures. One remedy is to repeat evaluative 
studies on the policy in your own service area but this is expensive 
and time-consuming. Even if you know the results of a good study 
in your own area, it will still only tell you average results which is 
not enough to help you figure out if this policy is likely to work 
with some particular family. We shall provide strategies that help 
you form an estimate of whether the policy or practice is likely to 
work for you. These strategies also have implications for 
researchers because they highlight the kinds of information that 
users need that research is currently not directed to investigating. 
This view of causality also has implications for how interventions 
are implemented. If we cannot be confident that our actions will 
have clear, predictable effects then more attention needs to be 
given to the ongoing study of what is happening and of how the 
intervention is functioning in the local context. Agencies are 
required to collect extensive performance management data for 
audit and inspection purposes but these are often more concerned 
with processes than with the impact the service is having on the 
children and young people it is intended to help. As we shall argue, 
it is this kind of information about what is happening to the 
families and children that is necessary to judge whether well-
intentioned efforts are in fact having the desired beneficial effects. 
The aim of Chapter 1 is to help you judge how to use research and 
how to implement an intervention. In deliberating about what to 
Introduction 
 17 
do to help children, young people and their families, of course, 
much more has to be considered besides causal factors, e.g. 
morals, rights, resources. But our aim in Chapter 1 is to help you 
predict if a policy will work in your context and also help you to 
use research to understand the causal processes that unfold as the 
policy is developed in practice, so that you can learn and adapt as 
you monitor effectiveness. While this first chapter on causality will 
illustrate the central importance of deliberation in practice, 
Chapter 2 will explore what we know about how to deliberate well 
and offer advice on how deliberation can be improved.  
Chapter 2 addresses the question “If the world is not simple and 
rules are not enough, then what more is needed?” The key aims 
here are to explain what is involved in deliberating, to show why it 
is essential and is not just a poor relation of analytic thinking we 
must tolerate until we find a way to eradicate it, how it can be 
done in better or worse ways and how it can be improved. We will 
begin by discussing the nature of human reasoning in general. 
Current understanding values both our intuitive and analytic skills 
and ascribes them complementary roles. While scientific methods 
rely heavily on our analytic skills, both sets of skills are needed in 
the total process of drawing on research and providing effective 
help to children and young people.  
In child welfare, professionals need to engage with family 
members who have agency. They are not passive recipients of a 
policy or intervention. They react to what is said or done to them 
and this, in turn, influences what the practitioner says and does. 
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Research has shown how influential the personal skills of a 
practitioner can be regardless of the specific intervention used. 
Their skills (or lack thereof) in engaging, showing warmth, and 
understanding the family’s point of view all can have an impact on 
the degree of change achieved. These skills require very fast micro 
decisions during an interview, regarding e.g. what to say or how to 
move, and hence require the speed of intuition. They can be 
improved through training and experience but cannot be fully 
written out in a manual, which implies that manuals for 
interventions cannot include all the variables that may influence 
the outcomes of interest. This has implications when discussing to 
what extent “fidelity to the model” will guarantee the desired 
outcomes. 
This second chapter will explore the nature of deliberation and 
offer some guidance on the features of “good” deliberation. The 
topic is familiar to practitioners who are well used to the task of 
putting together the evidence to argue for a particular assessment 
and plan for a child’s protection and support. It seems to us, 
however, that the skills involved in such tasks have received too 
little attention in recent years, with procedures, decision aids and 
research being presented as the key drivers of improved practice.  
In the Conclusion, we consider the implications of the points we 
have made. What do users of research need from researchers in 
order to help them deliberate? What questions must researchers 
answer to help users decide whether studies are relevant to them? 
How much can we expect research to contribute to the overall 
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process of working with families and what other skills and 
knowledge are needed? 
Some may argue that we are making the process of using research 
too complicated for busy professionals to manage. We agree that 
we are making big demands of you but there are both technical 
and moral arguments for this. If we want those using services to 
benefit from the rigour found in scientific research, then we cannot 
allow some steps in the process of using this research to be 
simplified to the point where rigour is lost. A chain is only as 
strong as its weakest link.
  
  
CHAPTER
 
ONE:
 
CAUSALITY
 
  
  23 
CHAPTER ONE: CAUSALITY 
Introduction 
As a child welfare practitioner or manager you need actively to 
expect complications. A lot of these have to do with what’s 
causing, or might cause, what. There is an ever present and 
bewildering variety of factors that might be causing the problem 
you are concerned with. Changes in family circumstances 
(independent of any intervention by you) can affect the child’s 
welfare, create new problems or alleviate existing ones. And any of 
your possible interventions may have a similar range of effects; 
something may work for one family in one setting but not for 
others or in different settings. In child welfare work you are not 
just concerned with predicting the consequences of your actions 
but also what is likely to happen in the family anyway, particularly 
whether the child will experience good enough care or suffer 
maltreatment. 
We aim here to offer some ways of thinking about the complicated 
processes that affect the welfare of the child and the success of 
your interventions, some ways of understanding and categorising 
them so you have a better chance of helping. A great deal of what 
we say will be familiar to you. What we hope to do is to make 
explicit a lot of your own intuitive knowledge, to bring it together 
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and to provide a system that brings it together in a way that can 
help you manage it better. 
Box 1.1 summarizes how the multiplicity of these causal factors 
makes your task complicated. 
Box 1.1 The multiplicity of causal factors 
Even if you are fairly confident that you have identified the 
sole or dominant problem you wish to relieve, why you want 
to relieve it and what would count as success, there will be 
many factors that contribute to or detract from success, and 
they are hard to identify. 
What you need to do  
When you are deliberating about the welfare of a child and the 
family, you need first to form some understanding of what the 
problems are. Then you have to figure out as best you can what 
the causes of these problems are and what is likely to happen if 
you do nothing. Then you must propose some possible courses of 
action and consider what would happen under any of these 
alternatives. Finally, you have to evaluate the upsides and 
downsides and make a decision (Box 1.2). 
Thinking through all the items in Box 1.2 is part of deliberation, 
which is the topic of Chapter 2. Here we focus solely on that part 
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of deliberation concerned with the second and third items on the 
list in Box 1.2 – a better understanding of the causes of the 
problems and what will happen if you do nothing. Among other 
topics, we will discuss how a particular kind of research – 
evaluative studies of interventions – can help you with some of 
these steps. The best known kind of evaluative study is the use of 
RCTs to show what difference an intervention, such as the Family 
Nurse Partnership, has made in study populations to achieving 
what we are interested in. That has been the focus of the 
information produced by the many websites that now offer 
guidance on research for policy-makers and professionals, which 
we discuss below. There are, however, many other kinds of 
research that can help – for example, psychological studies that 
attempt to clarify the impact of child abuse – and other kinds of 
evaluative studies – for example, longitudinal studies (where a 
cohort of individuals or families are followed up over many years 
so that changes and patterns can be seen) and econometric 
studies (sifting through large sets of data to identify patterns). 
And there are many other kinds of intervention than those 
prescribed by programmes. Helping a neglectful family get a 
garden gate mended so the toddler can’t wander into the road is 
certainly an intervention, because you do something to make the 
world different, however modestly. Good practice is full of low-
level interventions of this kind. 
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Box 1.2 Making your decision 
Working out what will help the family and child you are 
dealing with requires some understanding of the causes of 
success or failure of an intervention. You need to 
• know where your family and child’s problems lie  
• work out as best you can what the causes of these 
problems are  
• predict what is likely to happen if you do nothing  
• propose some courses of action  
• think through  
        º what would happen under these alternatives 
        º what the costs and benefits would be 
                 ‹› for whom  
• then decide the best course of action. 
 
The first, but long and difficult, step is to draw on your causal 
understanding of the family’s problems and on how any proposed 
intervention will work. In the evaluation literature, this is often 
called your “logic model” or “theory of change”. We prefer the 
term “causal narrative” because it reminds you that this is the kind 
of thing you do all the time in everyday life, for instance in 
deciding whether do the shopping before or after you pick up the 
children from school. “Logic model’ and “theory of change” suggest 
that the narrative is some kind of formal result that can be 
achieved by following rules, like a proof. We think it is nothing of 
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the kind. There are rules of thumb and strategies that can help. 
But they are just that: strategies. You must do your best to gather 
as much information from different sources as possible, to consult 
with others and to weave what you learn into the most coherent 
account of what is going on with the family and children that you 
can, and what you expect to happen if you intervene – or not – in 
various ways. But there are no set procedures to follow in doing so 
to ensure you get it right. That is why continuing monitoring and 
review are so important. 
We can help you get it right more often in two ways. First, we 
offer ways of thinking about the complicated causal processes that 
may be responsible for the problems you identify and the 
complicated causal processes that may occur when you set an 
intervention in train. We do this through the use of “causal 
narratives”, which typically involve drawing up “causal maps”. And 
we outline a number of strategies for helping you fill in the details 
of causal maps so that you can make decisions about what to do.  
Suppose that you have identified a problem and are trying to 
understand the causes of it. You need to produce a causal 
narrative: a story about what may be happening with the family 
and the child in his or her environment that is affecting the child, 
and a story about what will happen once an intervention is 
implemented, both what follows from what you do and what 
follows from the actions of others. The rest of this chapter is about 
a process that can be followed to help you to produce such 
narratives. It involves using causal maps. These are prompts to 
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help you focus on the different categories of information that you 
need to construct a causal narrative about how the problems are 
being brought about, what might happen when you intervene and 
what might be the effects for the welfare of the child of changes in 
family and environmental circumstances that might happen in the 
future. For concreteness, we will focus on the second stage: 
thinking about interventions and how they will work. But the 
strategies we offer for thinking about what will happen if an 
intervention is implemented can equally be turned to analysing 
what are the sources of the problems to begin with.  
Drawing up causal maps and thinking about how sure you can be 
about them will help you estimate as you go along how confident 
you can be in your explanations, predictions and interventions and 
what the dangers are that they will be wrong. It is unlikely that 
your assessment will or can take the form of a systematic analysis, 
with probabilities, of these uncertainties. But as you or you and 
your colleagues have thought about the problem, you will have 
become aware of the dangers that this or that step or link may be 
unreliable, how much it may matter if you have got it wrong, how 
and whether you can provide a contingency plan against such a 
failure, and how, as you follow what is happening after you have 
intervened, you may be able to spot that things are going wrong 
and why.  
Focusing specifically on interventions, and how you can go about 
thinking through what might result if they are adopted, one thing 
(but not the only thing) you definitely want to do is to take into 
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account whatever research evidence is available. There are now a 
number of good websites that vet and distil one kind of 
information for you about evaluative studies of interventions. We 
provide a list of these in Appendix 1.  
Our focus is on evaluative studies of interventions not because 
that kind of research, that kind of intervention or those methods of 
evaluation are all that matter. Rather, we use these studies as an 
example to draw out what we see as the central task you have to 
perform, whether you are a case officer deciding how to deal with 
this child in this family or the Head of Children’s Services trying to 
decide whether a particular programme will work for enough 
families in your district to try setting it up there.  
Three things you need to figure out 
Suppose, as the Head of Children’s Services, you have consulted 
one of these sites because you are considering making a new 
intervention available in your area. Or, as a practitioner working 
with a family, you have looked to these sites for more information 
about the array of locally-funded services that offer specific types 
of interventions (e.g. positive parenting courses at a Children’s 
Centre or psychoeducation and support courses about violent 
relationships for domestic violence victims through a local charity) 
in deliberating what might best help this family. You note that a 
particular intervention has been shown to have produced in some 
other settings results of the kind you aim for in your setting. That 
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is a starting point for your thinking – but just a starting point. We 
all know that the fact that an intervention has worked in some 
settings does not mean that it will do so in yours. If it is to help in 
your setting, either widely with many families or with a specific 
child and family in a specific environment, there are three things, 
which we shall explain, that must be true, which you probably 
already recognize though perhaps not set out in this direct way: 
• The intervention must be capable of helping to produce the 
targeted result in your setting. 
• The support factors necessary for it to do so are there, or 
you can arrange to get them there. 
• Nothing will happen in the setting to derail the intervention. 
The websites may help a little with this. But they tend to focus 
more on the evidence that the interventions they review work 
somewhere, than on these three specific kinds of information 
which you need to judge if the intervention is likely to work here, 
for this family. So you and your co-workers will need to think hard 
about these yourselves. Even where more information is supplied, 
which many sources are striving to do, putting all the information 
together and evaluating what it all amounts to for this family will 
require drawing heavily on your professional and practitioner 
experience. 
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Is the intervention capable of helping in your setting? 
Interventions don’t produce results by miracle, nor by accident. 
When they work, it is for a reason: because they do something. So 
the intervention should have some theory behind it. It needn’t be 
a deep theory. For instance, sending fathers to parenting classes 
might be intended to reduce their beating the child by teaching 
them other ways to affect the child’s behaviour. But the theory can 
be deeper. It may draw on behavioural learning theory to explain 
why the fathers are responding to certain behaviours in their 
children (like crying or shouting) with violence, the intervention 
being aimed at altering this conditioned response. The job here is 
to understand why the intervention is supposed to work, and the 
clue is with the word by: it works by doing x. It is because the 
intervention can do that – for instance, teach fathers to respond in 
a less violent way when they hear the child crying – that the 
intervention can help produce the result you want. Let’s call this 
the role the intervention is supposed to play. 
It is important to identify this role because the very same 
intervention does not always play the same role in different 
circumstances. In some cultures, sending fathers to parenting 
classes may indeed fill the role of teaching them better methods to 
affect the child’s behaviour. But there may be other cultures in 
which being forced to attend parenting classes is a humiliation. 
The fathers go but don’t take in what they are being taught, they 
feel publicly belittled and they go home and beat the child. 
Without substantial cultural change, sending fathers to parenting 
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classes cannot play the role it is supposed to in this kind of setting. 
It is not capable of helping to produce the desired result there.  
 
Box 1.4 Step one: Identify the causal role 
Is the intervention capable of producing the effect in view? 
To answer that, you will need to understand how it is 
supposed to produce this effect: it does so by doing what? 
Once you know how it is supposed to work, you need to 
decide: can it work that way here for this child and this 
family in this setting? 
What support factors are needed? 
Suppose your intervention can play the right role in your setting so 
it is capable of producing the right result. You might recognise this 
because it has been producing good results on average in families 
that seem a lot like the one you are concerned about. But that is 
just an average result. You know it has worked with some of those 
families and not with others. What can be responsible for the 
differences? One thing to keep centrally in focus is that even if an 
intervention can work with your family – say, sending the fathers 
to parenting classes works by teaching them less harmful ways to 
respond to the child’s crying and there is no reason to think this 
father will not listen and try to take up some of the suggestions if 
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he attends – still it may not actually do so because some of the 
other factors are missing that are necessary for the intervention to 
work as it should – you send the father but he can’t get there for 
the simple reason that the buses no longer run by the time he gets 
home from work.  
The interventions available in child welfare are seldom enough on 
their own to produce results. They need help, what we call support 
factors. Striking a match is a good way to get a flame. But not if it 
is sopping wet or there is no oxygen in the room. It is just the 
same with causes in child welfare, or anywhere else for that 
matter. The one you concentrate on is almost never sufficient by 
itself to produce the targeted result. There’s always a whole team 
of support factors needed as well. If you don’t have these in your 
setting, or can’t arrange for them to be there, your intervention 
will not produce the intended result even if it is in principle capable 
of doing so in this case. 
For example, the first Sure Start centres set up in England in the 
late 1990s aimed to improve the development of children from 
disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds. Services were 
provided as universally available within the locality with the hope 
of reducing stigma, but in practice this was found to lead to more 
affluent families using the centres and the most disadvantaged 
staying away. One of the support factors for this and most 
interventions is that the relevant people attend to receive the 
intervention. 
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Or, consider parenting classes again. One mother we know of had 
been referred to six different parenting programmes, each one of 
which had approximately six sessions apiece, and she diligently 
attended all of them.  Yet the problematic behaviours of her child 
persisted. She hadn’t taken in the lessons or changed her own 
behaviour. One reason for lack of uptake like this can be the 
parents' beliefs about the cause of the problems. Some parents 
think that when a child presents behaviour problems – like temper 
tantrums – the child needs diagnosis and treatment. It is not 
uncommon to hear parents insist ‘Someone needs to fix him’. But 
generally social services take a different attitude failing evidence 
to the contrary: a broken child is a symptom of broken parenting. 
Hence the parents are sent to parenting classes. But the parenting 
classes won’t work without the support of the parents’ belief that 
what they do is central in affecting the child’s behaviour. And this 
is the kind of support factor that you can sometimes get into 
place, for instance by serious discussions with the parents about 
the relationship between a child’s behavioural problems and the 
behaviour of the adults who interact regularly with the child.  
This highlights the importance in general of the practitioner 
checking out a parent’s understandings and expectations of an 
intervention, including how it’s “supposed” to work, rather than 
simply prescribing the intervention, which is something that newly 
qualified workers sometimes do, skipping the explanation and 
checking-out steps as if the intervention is self-explanatory.  This 
is an essential support factor in almost any intervention’s success. 
Chapter One: Causality 
 35 
The organisational context is also a major influence on how the 
intervention is implemented, with local factors sometimes 
hampering the way people can act. The Signs of Safety (Turnell, A. 
& Murphy T. 2015)	approach requires practitioners to spend more 
time with families than has been the norm in England so that they 
can engage better with them and motivate them to work to solve 
problems. Is the organisation able to create different priorities and 
resources so that this requirement can be met? A failure to 
scrutinise the wider context in deciding whether and how to 
implement a new intervention is a common factor in innovations 
that fail. After reviewing the poor success record in everyday 
practice of welfare and education reforms that had some research 
evidence of working, Lisbeth Schorr (1998) commented: 
We failed to see that you can’t grow roses in concrete. Human 
service reformers and educators alike thought the challenge 
was to develop new ideas, not to change institutions. They 
assumed an innovation or a ‘good product’ would become part 
of a mainstream system because of its merit, unconstrained 
by the system’s funding, rule making, standard setting and 
accountability requirements – all of which are likely to be 
inconsistent with the innovation. 
Cake diagrams, our first type of causal map, are helpful for 
representing the support factors that interventions need. Figure 
1.1 is an example of such a diagram. 
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Intervention: Parenting classes 
Desired outcome: Better response to temper tantrums 
 
Figure 1.1: An example of a cake map (Causal map type 1) 
 
The central point of these cake diagrams is to get you to focus on 
the need for support factors. But it is important to recognise that 
no matter how knowledgeable we are, we will seldom be able to fill 
in a cake with enough factors to ensure the outcome: that is why 
you see the large slice marked “other”. At best we can hope to 
understand what is making, or will make, an outcome more likely. 
The importance of identifying what support factors you need is not 
then that the set you chart is likely to be sufficient for the outcome 
– you will almost always miss out some so what you chart will 
almost never be enough to ensure it will happen. But rather, these 
factors are necessary. If one is missing and you cannot find a good 
substitute to put in its place, the intervention won’t produce the 
Parents recognise
their role in affecting
child behaviour
Parenting
classes
Other
Intervention: Parenting classes
Desired outcome: Better response to temper tentrums
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outcome you expect. So when you are considering an intervention, 
make sure all the support factors will be in place at the time, 
otherwise you won’t see the results you want (see Box 1.5).  
The same way of thinking can also be helpful earlier, when you ask 
not whether an intervention will produce the envisaged outcomes 
but rather ask what is causing the problem in the first place. If you 
think a particular cause is partly at fault for a problem you have 
identified, you can check to see if the requisite support factors are 
there since, if they are missing, it cannot be this cause that is 
producing the effect after all. If the requisite support factors are 
not there, look elsewhere for the causes.  
 
Box 1.5 Step two: Identify the support factors 
The cause you focus on (the “salient” cause) is seldom 
enough to produce the result on its own. It generally needs a 
whole team of support factors to work with it to produce the 
desired result. So if the desired result is to be achieved you 
need to identify what the requisite support factors are in 
your case and ensure they will be in place. 
 
Here are a few important things to keep in mind in using cake 
diagrams. Many of the things we say here, as throughout the 
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book, will be familiar. That is true of our approach generally. We 
want you to use the familiar knowledge you already have from 
your experience, more richly. The first is that the same salient 
factor – the same intervention or the same possible cause of a 
problem – can figure in more than one cake: there is more than 
one set of factors that can couple with the intervention or cause to 
produce the same effect. For instance, there are surely a large 
number of different sets of factors that can couple with substance 
misuse to make child abuse more likely. So too with interventions.  
This is helpful to keep in mind since sometimes a support factor 
you have identified is missing for an intervention that you might 
like to try. Yet maybe there is a substitute that you can get into 
place that will do the same job in supporting the work of the 
intervention. For example, one support factor for an intervention 
might be communicating in English with the service user. This may 
not work with some people, so providing interpreters can be an 
alternative way of achieving the goal of communicating. 
Second, there are more ways than one to skin a cat. More 
generally, there are almost always more ways than one to produce 
a given result – more than one set of factors that working together 
makes the effect likely. Using our cake metaphor: there generally 
are more cakes than one, each with different ingredients that can 
produce the same outcome. This is all too familiar in child welfare 
work, where many individuals will suffer more than one set of 
factors, each by itself enough to create the problem you are 
concerned with. This is illustrated by the multiple pathways by 
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which someone may, as an adult, become a child abuser (example 
borrowed from Munro, Taylor and Bradbury-Jones 2013). 
Consider Person A, who was abused as a child. In this particular 
context, for this particular person (Person A), all the factors 
depicted in Figure 1.2 are necessary to bring about the outcome of 
becoming an adult perpetrator of abuse. A history of child abuse is 
by itself insufficient in Person A to cause the effect. It requires all 
the other factors to be present at the same time in order to lead 
Person A to perpetrate abuse on a child. This may explain why 
 
Figure 1.2: A cake diagram for Person A (Abused as a child) 
some people go through periods of abusing children in their care 
and not abusing, because at certain times, some support factors 
will be missing or present. However, we are not proposing that the 
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Alcohol/drugs 
 
factors that are present for Person A are applicable to all. The 
conditions vary between individuals, as demonstrated in Person B 
(Figure 1.3). With Person B a different set of insufficient but 
necessary factors combine to lead to adult perpetration. For 
Person B, a completely different set of factors is associated with 
being a perpetrator of abuse. Person B was not abused as a child, 
but a number of factors combine to create an environment for 
perpetration of abuse to occur in this particular person's life. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: A cake diagram for Person B (Not abused as a child) 
As depicted in Figure 1.4, Person C, like Person A, has undergone 
a history of child abuse, but Person C differs from Person A in that 
other factors never combined with this history. They are separated 
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out in the cake diagram. For this particular person, adulthood does 
not include perpetration of abuse upon children. Although some of 
the same necessary conditions are present, they are insufficient 
unless combined with others. A whole set of supporting factors 
need to come together to make the outcome likely.  
 
Figure 1.4: A cake diagram for Person C 
 (Abused as a child: conditions not combined) 
However, all of the above are unnecessary in the sense that 
another cluster of factors may be responsible for abuse in another 
person. So the six factors associated with Person A, for instance, 
are only necessary for that particular person and only necessary 
for that person when all combined together.  
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The good news is that the same generally holds for interventions. 
There is often more than one thing you can do to relieve a 
problem, supposing of course that all the support factors are in 
place for each of these. This is familiar but sometimes we can lose 
sight of it when we are frustrated that a particular intervention we 
would like to use is not available or, irritatingly, that the 
intervention is available but not all the required support factors are 
there. This is one way you can make use of the resources that 
those intervention effectiveness websites offer. They can alert you 
to other interventions that might be able to do the same job. And, 
as always, talking to your colleagues can help you think of 
something you might have overlooked.  
One warning about multiple cakes: suppose there are multiple 
cakes for the same cause all operating together in the same 
situation. We may be tempted to think that their influence is in a 
sense “additive”: with two sets of causes each for the same effect, 
you may expect to get double the effect. But that is often not so. 
Sometimes two different sets of factors (represented in two 
different cakes) can interact in a way that heightens or lessens the 
effects of each. Or they may together have no effect, or even an 
effect opposite to the one each set would have on its own, a 
phenomenon known as a “reversal of effect direction”.  
This is something to keep in mind when you want to predict the 
effects of interventions. The reversal of effect direction can 
happen, for example, when several services become involved in 
providing different types of help to a family with a cumulative 
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impact not of strengthening the family as intended but of 
disempowering the parents to the point that they fail to make 
progress in learning how to provide adequate care themselves or 
confusing them because they don’t know what is most useful or 
effective to focus on first, as different demands or 
recommendations from different agencies are not always well-
coordinated.  (Within Children’s Services in England, Team Around 
the Child or Child in Need meetings are supposed to help with this 
potential confusion.) It is fairly typical for the overall effect of two 
interventions deployed together to be considerably less than the 
sum of what each can be expected to produce on its own. For 
instance, if the Health Visitor and the Housing Support Worker 
both provide a supportive intervention, they may play more or less 
the same role, so that introducing one when the other is already in 
place may not produce much added value. (An exception might be 
a deliberate combined approach, e.g. offering a Positive Parenting 
course combined with training and support to parents in 
maintaining a strong emotional connection with a child who has 
learning difficulties.) 
This often matters when you think of using in the UK interventions 
that have had good success in a variety of US settings. In a great 
many areas of concern, the general level of provision of care for 
families already in place in the UK, including the wider scope of 
welfare benefits, programmes through Children’s Centres and 
input from Children’s Social Care teams, is greater than in the US, 
in which case adding the new intervention in your setting in the UK 
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may not produce anything like the same level of results as it did in 
the US.  
A third thing to note in these cakes is how large the slice marked 
“other” generally is. Sometimes we can identify a number of the 
factors that need to be in place if the salient cause is to do its job. 
For instance, findings on the types of parental problems that 
reduce the effectiveness of parenting classes give some guidance 
on which parents are likely to benefit – those, for example, who do 
not suffer social isolation, maternal depression or extra-familial 
conflict (Macdonald 2001). Still, even in rare cases like this where 
we have a good understanding of the causal processes involved, 
there are very few effects in the field of child welfare where we 
can fill in the cake well enough to ensure that the outcome is 
highly probable given that those support factors are present. There 
is just far too much individual variation.  
This is something that we all recognise when it comes to the 
causes of child abuse. Substance misuse may be conducive to 
child abuse or neglect but is far from sufficient on its own to lead 
to maltreatment. Most who misuse substances do not become 
child abusers. Even when substance misuse is coupled with known 
risk factors – what we are calling “support factors” within the 
causal cake – such as mental ill health and poverty, they are far 
from sufficient and many with this combination will not harm the 
children in their care (although the issue of significant harm here 
may be strongly linked to how old the affected children are, and 
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whether they have enough autonomy to be able to ask for help 
without the intervention of the abusing parent).  
We can easily forget the full force of the lesson when we think 
about interventions. It applies to thinking about interventions to 
stop, prevent or diminish child abuse just as it did in thinking 
about the causes of child abuse. Even when implemented as well 
as possible with all the support factors we know about in place, 
they will generally be far from sufficient to produce the result 
aimed for in all cases. Perhaps the language often used makes this 
lesson easy to forget: we talk of “causes” of child abuse and of 
“what works” to prevent it. It is better to remember that good 
interventions may be conducive to the results you want but that 
even the best, most effective interventions may fail much of the 
time. The results are often reported in terms of comparing the 
average impact in the experimental group with that of the control 
group and this obscures a wide variation from some who fared 
much better than the average to those who fared much worse. 
This is why, in this book, we talk only about interventions “helping 
to produce targeted results”. For example, David Olds’ first 
evaluation of the Family-Nurse Partnership reported effectiveness 
overall, but that covered significant improvement for low-income 
families and no significant improvement for wealthier families 
(Olds 2006). 
Fourth, even the phrase “helping to produce targeted results” may 
be over-optimistic. An intervention that is helpful or neutral for 
most people may, for some, contribute to a worsening of their 
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problems. This means that there are support factors that couple 
with the intervention to produce beneficial results and there are 
support factors that couple with it to produce negative results, and 
very often we don’t know what either of these are. We are all 
familiar with the diversity of people’s responses to drugs with 
some having very adverse (even life-threatening) reactions to a 
chemical mix that is beneficial for most people. The same diversity 
of response occurs in social and psychological interventions. For 
instance, in many clinical trials a percentage – 5 to 10% according 
to Lambert and Ogles (2004) – of those individuals given the 
“successful” treatment leave the trial worse off than when they 
came in and in subsequent general use of the treatment these 
figures can be worse. Another study they cite reports that in the 
child psychotherapy community mental health settings it reviewed, 
the numbers harmed were 24% and in managed care settings, the 
numbers harmed were 14%. 
Will your intervention get derailed?  
It is clear that however conscientiously you analyse your problem, 
using for example our cake diagrams, you may not get the result 
you want. This can happen in several ways. 
• Interruption. The process may be interrupted, as in our step-
by-step diagram (Figure 1.5). Things may be progressing just as 
hoped when, unexpectedly, something happens to put a stop to it. 
For instance, the mother’s violent ex-boyfriend shows up out of 
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nowhere and moves back in. But we shouldn’t always think in 
terms of interruptions as intrusions that drop in from outside to 
block the route to improvement. Sometimes what happens is that 
a support factor, which you had rightly identified as a slice in a 
good cake, and reasonably identified as likely to be present, and 
indeed present at the start, disappears. The grandmother who was 
giving the children breakfast and getting them off to school 
quarrels with the mother and stops coming. Interruptions can thus 
look more like Figure 1.6 than like Figure 1.5. Of course, there is 
no firm distinction between these two modes of interruption. But 
they may provide different spurs to the imagination for you.  
 
Figure 1.5: An interruption in a step-by-step diagram for better 
parenting 
You recommend
parenting classes Mother enrols
Mother attends
Mother takes in
the lessons
Mother attempts
to  implement
lessons
Mother responds
better to child’s
behaviour
a.
You recommend
parenting classes Mother enrols Mother attends
Mother takes in
the lessons
Mother attempts
to  implement
lessons
Mother responds
better to child’s
behaviour
b.
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Figure 1.6: An interruption in cake diagram for better school 
attendance 
• Offsetting. The beneficial effect of your intervention on the 
achievement of your target may be offset, overwhelmed even, by 
bad effects on that same target from other sets of causes which 
you had not foreseen. Your intervention is indeed a member of a 
good cake which works (for example, all the support factors are 
present), and indeed in a sense it does work, but the positive 
results are not visible because other factors have been present 
with an even stronger negative impact. You may have achieved a 
kind of “counterfactual” success: matters would have been even 
worse had your intervention not been at work. On the other hand, 
Teachers 
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if an intervention is too weak in the face of the negative effects, it 
may not be worth implementing. Put your efforts into looking for 
some alternatives. 
• Self-defeat. Your intervention may have good results by one 
route but negative effects on the very same target by another 
route. For instance, many of the things you do to help parents can 
at the same time make them feel dependent and unable to act for 
themselves. So the intervention itself produces a negative effect 
as well as a good one. And of course you must always watch out 
for bad side effects of what you do. You may improve the targeted 
outcome but the situation gets worse overall because of the 
negative side effects of your intervention. For example, a mother 
attending a parenting class may make friends with another mother 
who introduces her to a new illegal drug supplier. 
This is of the greatest importance in child welfare. It is too easy to 
concentrate on the good that an intervention may achieve in the 
area of the child’s needs which are the focus of attention and 
neglect the risk that that same intervention may do serious harm 
in an area which you have forgotten to concentrate on. This is 
another obvious point but it can be lost sight of when the focus is 
on what works. The danger is not just that your intervention may 
fail, costing not only lost resources but also dashed hopes. It is 
also that it may do genuine harm. Removing a child from the birth 
family may offer the best opportunities of meeting the child’s 
needs but, on rare occasions, he or she may suffer severe 
maltreatment in the alternative care. An example of this is that in 
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Rotherham girls were sent to residential care because it was hoped 
that they would be looked after better there, but that same 
intervention led to sexual exploitation in their new homes (Jay 
2014). 
We need to make clear that these recommendations, and those 
which follow, cannot guarantee success, nor even guarantee that 
what you do achieves the best possible chance of success. It is a 
commonplace in the statistical literature and practical guides which 
use those insights that we cannot expect certainty and that any 
interventions we propose will have uncertain outcomes. It is often 
suggested that this uncertainty can usefully be represented in 
terms of probabilities. So if an intervention requires the presence 
of three support factors, then we can attach probabilities to the 
presence of each of these, and hence calculate the odds that the 
intervention will succeed. This way of thinking aims to achieve a 
precise measure of the uncertainty we face.  
But we think that the problem of uncertainty is worse than this, 
and that fact has to be faced. It is not just that we find it hard to 
attach probabilities to the presence of the support factors. More 
serious, we don’t fully understand how to answer the two key 
questions about causal roles and their required support. We are 
always in danger of misunderstanding how things work and how 
they will work if we intervene, and of not taking into account 
events which we simply failed to anticipate and see the future 
significance of. These uncertainties, doubts, or imaginative failures 
cannot be summarized in a single number for the probability of 
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success. Two most likely consequences of over-estimating our 
ability to predict what will work in child welfare are that time and 
money will be spent on services that have disappointing results 
and that policy-makers and professionals will become too confident 
and assertive in telling families that they know what is best for 
them, thus further disempowering many who already have low 
status in society.  
This is not a counsel of despair. Certainly you can often decide to 
intervene with a good chance of success. But you must also expect 
failure, and so monitor progress and plan in advance how to deal 
with failure if that is what you get. And equally important, you 
must not expect our suggestions, let alone techniques such as 
decision trees or cost-benefit analysis, to provide the certainty 
which you would like. In difficult cases that certainty is not 
available, nor even clarity about probabilities. This is particularly 
important in child protection settings where you face the serious 
contextual problem that professional “failures” are not readily 
tolerated, which can very much restrict your perspective of the 
process.  When risks are increasing, then tolerance for “failures” 
(either family failures to produce beneficial change, or professional 
failures to pick up on signs of increased concern) wanes quickly, 
and options narrow. Sadly, our advice cannot solve this problem 
beyond the obvious: monitor, watch for warning signs, have fall-
back plans in place and keep discussing with your colleagues to 
get a range of perspectives. 
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Strategies for delivering the three steps 
So to evaluate the chances that an intervention you are 
considering will produce a specific result you are aiming for, you 
need to carry out three steps. The first deals with causal roles, the 
second with support factors, the third with factors that can derail 
the process. 
Step One  
1. Identify the causal role the intervention is supposed to play  
AND  
2. Evaluate if it is capable of playing that role in your setting. 
Step Two 
1. Identify what support factors will be necessary for it to work 
in your setting 
AND  
2. Evaluate whether those support factors are there in the 
setting, or you can arrange to get them there.  
Step Three 
1. Identify what might derail your intervention  
AND  
2. Evaluate what to do to mitigate the danger of derailment, 
including choosing another intervention where the one you are 
considering may be self-defeating. 
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How do you do all that? There is no formula, no magic bullet. We 
can, though, describe some strategies that can help. But it is 
important to emphasise that they are no more than suggestions or 
hints. None is guaranteed to give you the insights you need, and 
people will differ in which strategy they find useful for what 
purpose. Their selection and use therefore exemplify the need for 
imagination and judgement as an essential feature of the 
deliberation process needed to deal with hard problems, on which 
we say more in Chapter 2. And the need for professional and 
practitioner judgement based on experience.  
We shall focus on guidance for helping you see what you need to 
know when you are trying to predict if your intervention will 
produce the improvements you are aiming for. But the same 
lessons help with diagnosis and risk assessment: trying to figure 
out what is producing the bad outcomes in the first place and 
what, independent of your intervention, might produce undesirable 
outcomes in the future. 
Here then is the list. All these strategies are designed to help with 
the steps we have identified. And in each case, the aim is to create 
a causal narrative by means of a causal map. 
• Consider alternative accounts. It would be nice if we could 
in every or even in most or even in the typical case draw a causal 
map which was plainly the best available, meaning that it dealt 
better with each of the steps listed above than any of the 
alternatives. Part of the problem, however, is that the solution, the 
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causal map, is underdetermined, that is, the evidence available is 
insufficient to identify beyond argument which conclusion we 
should reach. In trying to understand why a mother is neglecting 
the emotional needs of her child, it may be possible to identify 
some salient factors in her background – e.g. depression, 
substance misuse – but they are not the total possible explanation. 
There may be other factors that are causally important – e.g. a 
new partner unknown to the practitioners who is absorbing her 
attention.  
A general piece of advice is to consult others when trying to think 
of alternative accounts. Do not rely on your own imaginative 
policing of your thinking but get other views. This is particularly 
valuable in child welfare where people can have different 
background information about both the family and the 
environment. In the example above, for instance, the health 
visitor may be aware of the new partner or the child’s teacher may 
have a greater understanding of the family’s culture and how this 
may influence their participation in any intervention. The multi-
agency meetings that are a standard feature in children’s services 
can be good places for generating alternative accounts.  
Disputes often arise in child welfare discussions where there are 
rival accounts. For example, in the enquiry into the death of 
Victoria Climbié it is reported that hospital nurses thought that 
Victoria showed fear when her aunt visited while the social worker 
thought she showed the respect that was the norm in her African 
culture (Laming 2003). 
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In such discussions, the dynamics of the group is a key factor in 
how well this strategy works. In many instances, the culture of the 
group inhibits people from offering alternatives, fearing that they 
will be seen as troublesome or ill-mannered, so that the account 
offered first or by the most senior person present goes 
unchallenged. It is important to avoid premature closure of critical 
discussion but this may be a difficult task to achieve. 
One tip is simple. When you are trying to complete the three 
steps, revisit your conclusions or your hypotheses as much as time 
and circumstances allow. And do that not only by thinking it all out 
by yourself – What might I have missed? Could this fact point in 
quite another direction? Continue to consult other people. 
• Crystal ball method. The crystal ball method offers one good 
way to think about whether your intervention can play the right 
role and you have the right support factors in place. You ask your 
team to pretend that a crystal ball shows that in a few weeks or 
months your new venture will have failed. The team members 
then write down all the reasons they can think of for why it failed. 
This method will not identify all the flaws, but it helps us to 
prepare ourselves and our teams by anticipating some of the 
problems. This idea was made popular by Gary Klein, who has 
done a lot of research on how professionals make decisions and 
act. It offers one very good way to decide if your intervention can 
play the right role and you have the right support factors in place 
(Klein 2009).  
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Setting yourselves the crystal ball task helps to bring out the 
factors that are needed in the causal map, a more detailed account 
of how the intervention is expected to produce the desired results. 
It also sharpens people’s thinking about the support factors that 
need to be in place for the intervention to work. One of the 
strengths of using this method in a group is that it gives a clear 
message that it is all right to mention risks, to discuss the 
possibility of the plan going wrong. It encourages people to use 
their creativity, to look for difficulties, and to be rewarded for 
finding them. After people have individually made some notes, you 
go around the room asking for feedback. By starting with the 
person who is in charge of the proposal, it sets up a clear dynamic 
of critical appraisal of the plan. This contrasts with a typical 
scenario where an enthusiastic boss presents the plan to the group 
and asks if anyone has any criticisms or concerns. People are then 
frequently reluctant to mention weaknesses that they can see in 
the proposals for fear of being considered troublemakers or of 
going against the consensus of the group. 
Here is an example of using the crystal ball method. Suppose a 
team is considering implementing the Signs of Safety (SofS) 
practice framework in an English children’s social care department 
and there is strong backing for this from the workforce who have 
seen examples of this way of working. Conducting a crystal ball 
session, they imagine that one year later the implementation is 
faltering, with many having been trained but little evidence of 
change in the direct work with families, although there should 
have been radical reforms in what was done, in what tools were 
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used to inform the work, in outcomes for children and in families’ 
reactions to this new way of working. What problems might they 
think had contributed to this? 
As we mentioned earlier, the context in which the intervention is 
being used is very influential. Signs of Safety is a way of working 
that requires more time with families, and especially with children, 
than is typically available in the present system. What might lead 
to this support factor not being present?  A discussion in an 
agency considering implementing Signs of Safety produced the 
following possible scenarios: 
Ø All the existing demands on social workers’ time were 
maintained at their old level so that working in this more 
intensive way was something they were expected to achieve in 
their own time.  
Ø Signs of Safety brought additional recording tasks that did not 
fit with the existing system and so much recording had to be 
duplicated, thereby increasing further what was demanded of 
social workers. 
Ø Support was half-hearted so that the approach was only 
partially implemented and this was experienced as 
unsatisfactory, leading to demoralisation and further reduction 
in support. 
Ø Senior managers failed to value the improved quality of direct 
work, because of their continued focus on compliance with 
performance indicators which score outputs, excluding direct 
work. This diminished social workers’ enthusiasm.  
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Ø Signs of Safety required a higher level of sharing thinking 
about a case among the social workers. The current policy of 
“hot desking” made it hard to create supportive groups of 
colleagues and there was no systemic model in place, for 
instance one where everyone within a Unit participates in the 
weekly review of all cases held by that Unit, to ensure more 
shared thinking and talking about each case. 
Ø Other agencies mistakenly saw Signs of Safety as simply 
looking at families’ strengths and thought it was dangerously 
prone to overlook danger to children so social workers felt 
scared to use it in case a tragedy occurred and they were 
blamed. 
 
Signs of Safety uses tools for recording information when with the 
family, for example the Three Houses tool is used to find out what 
children are experiencing and thinking, so Safety Plans are drawn 
up as a joint venture. This means that social workers need to 
record information not just when in front of the computer in the 
office. What might lead to this support factor not being present? 
Possible scenarios identified are: 
 
Ø Social workers might feel too unskilled to be able to work in 
such a novel and creative way on their own in people’s homes. 
Ø The tools are not available. But actually in this case everything 
is in place for plans to be drafted in the meeting with the 
family, typed up back in the office, and then taken back to the 
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family to be signed as a more formal agreement. So this is 
deemed not to be a risk. 
Ø The completed information cannot be uploaded to the child’s 
electronic file except as an attachment which is likely to be 
overlooked by subsequent readers of the file. 
 
If a crystal ball exercise is carried out in this way, each of these 
possible hindrances to the effective implementation of Signs of 
Safety can be examined and thought can be given to how the risk 
might be mitigated so that the final plan of implementation has a 
higher probability of success. 
Note how ordinary and practical these difficulties are. Particularly 
when the intervention fails, they are often referred to as difficulties 
in implementation, suggesting that there was nothing really wrong 
with the intervention but that it was just not put into effect 
correctly. We say that the identification of the relevance and 
presence of the relevant support factors is integral to the 
intervention and that it is just as important as the grander task of 
clarifying its causal role. And it is professional and practitioner 
experience that is particularly good at deliberating about such 
identification. 
• Thinking step-by-step and thinking backwards. To 
estimate whether your intervention is likely to work, you need to 
set out the support factors. Recall: these are the conditions that 
have to be met if the intervention is to work here. The members of 
the list need not be set out in any particular order. It could, 
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without loss, be randomly. The crystal ball method just discussed 
involves no particular ordering of the factors. Nor do our cake 
maps. The factors are not listed in any order, nor do they reflect 
any order in the process by which your intervention is supposed to 
produce your desired outcome, and we did not impose any order 
on them in our thinking. But in this section we suggest that time 
ordering can help a great deal with evaluating if the intervention 
will produce the results you hope for, in particular it can help you 
unearth the support factors necessary for it to work. 
One way of thinking about support factors and contributions is 
analogous to how you describe the workings of a machine, such as 
an internal combustion engine. In describing the cycles of an Otto 
four-stroke gasoline engine, you talk about the Intake stroke, 
which has to precede the Compression stroke, which is succeeded 
by the Power stroke, and finally by the Exhaust stroke. Each of 
these is not only necessary for the result, but each has to happen 
as part of that sequence. It is no good just listing the four strokes 
in any old order. 
Now, we are not saying that Society is a Machine. What we take 
from this description is that when talking about how to identify 
support factors it is helpful to think in this step-by-step way 
through the process that you expect to happen, starting with the 
introduction of the intervention and ending with the targeted 
outcome. Drawing on your understanding of how it will work can 
help you think of the different steps that need to take place if the 
desired outcome is to occur: the mother has to agree to attend, 
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she has to turn up, qualified staff must be available, etc. Nor do 
we say that all relevant factors will form part of a sequence. In 
some cases, it will not matter at all in what order things happen. 
Sometimes it will matter a lot that this happens before that. So, as 
with all the strategies here, the step-by-step strategy is offered as 
no more than one technique that may serve to show what 
conditions have to be satisfied, and when, for a positive 
contribution to be made. 
The technique is to think through how the intervention leads to the 
desired outcome. Just what should happen, one step after another, 
starting with the intervention and ending where you want to be? 
You can picture this in our second type of causal map, the familiar 
step-by-step process diagram, depicted in Figure 1.7.  
 
Figure 1.7: A generic step-by-step map (Causal map type 2) 
 
Things can go wrong at every step. And in just the ways we have 
been discussing. The salient factor at step 2 may not play the right 
role in your setting to produce what is necessary at step 3 in order 
to go on to step 4, and so on, or, maybe it can play the right role 
but the requisite support factors may not obtain then. Focusing on 
each step, one at a time, can help you to identify what needs to 
happen, and when, for the next step to follow. Gathering all these 
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conditions together tells you what you need if the whole process is 
going to carry off successfully. 
You can do this either starting at the beginning with the 
intervention implementation and ending with the targeted 
outcome, or by thinking backwards, from the outcome to the 
intervention. It is often hard to think through the whole process. 
So sometimes it is a good idea to start at both ends and work 
toward the middle, hoping to get far enough to meet yourself 
there. 
• Quick exit decision trees. Decision trees are a familiar device 
for helping with figuring out what to do. Working Together to 
Safeguard Children (2009), the statutory guidance on case 
management in England, has used them in the flow charts on how 
to manage cases. A “quick exit” decision tree allows you to 
eliminate some options quickly and so simplify the reasoning task 
you face. The trees start off with a fork at which a question is 
asked. Two branches lead off from the fork, one branch of which 
leads to NO, the other to YES. The NO is a dead end. Suppose the 
first question is “Have we got the money to do this?” If the answer 
is NO, you stop. If it is YES, you go on down the branch to the 
next question. And so on. 
If the answer is NO, some decision trees, not ours, lead into 
another question, such as “Could we get consent?” and then into 
further alternatives. If one of those generates a YES, then you 
could be led back to the end of the YES branch of the first fork. 
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And so on. There is no end to the complexity of decision trees, as 
the wide variety of software available to guide decision-making 
shows. But the quick exit decision tree is simple.  
Thinking like this, and using this simple quick exit decision tree 
structure, makes you concentrate on identifying which conditions 
are not fulfilled, which forks lead to a NO. This makes these trees 
a good tool early in deliberation when you still have a lot of 
interventions under consideration. You only need one NO to reject 
an intervention and move on to consider the next proposal. The 
quick exit structure encourages you to look for, and identify early, 
necessary conditions that will appear in many, or maybe all, cakes 
where your intervention variable appears. It is no good thinking 
through all the factors needed to make a parenting intervention 
work if all new interventions need money, and at a time of cuts 
there is no money for new interventions. You don’t have to 
undertake the daunting task of getting all the necessary factors 
listed before you look to see whether the intervention will work. 
Nor do you have to consider factors in any special order. As soon 
as you hit a necessary factor that won’t be there for you (or that 
you won’t be able to obtain), you know the intervention is unlikely 
to work. That’s the beauty of thinking in terms of necessary 
factors. 
For example, suppose you are working in the UK with a family 
where the children are missing a lot of school and show general 
signs of neglect. You have noted that the mother is depressed and 
she and the father quarrel constantly. You suspect this is a major 
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contributor to the neglect of the children. So you consider urging 
them to attend couples therapy, which you know is one of the five 
kinds of therapy approved for treatment of depression in the NHS. 
But you wonder if this is the best strategy given the other options 
and the limited willingness and ability of the parents to take on 
much new.  You think of constructing some causal maps for 
different options to help you decide. It may be best to try a few 
quick exit trees before getting sunk into the complicated process 
of comparing options.  
Consider a couple of immediate questions. Is the mother 
depressed? YES, she has been diagnosed to be depressed and 
there is much evidence of this affecting her interactions with the 
children. So on to the next. Is the treatment available? All five 
depression therapies may not be offered in the local area where 
the family lives, and couples therapy in particular is in short 
supply. So, Is couples therapy available in the family’s area? NO! 
Okay then, you don’t need to think further about that option, you 
don’t need to worry about other factors that might affect the 
outcomes of couples therapy for the parents: this option is a no-
go. (A quick exit tree for this example is illustrated in Figure 1.8.) 
 
 
Figure 1.8. A quick exit decision tree 
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There is, of course, a more positive use of these quick exit trees. If 
you have carried on long enough and have covered all the 
conditions necessary for your intervention to work, with YES at 
every node, and you can be reasonably confident that you have 
done so, then you have good reason to believe your intervention 
will work here in your circumstances. 
The quick exit decision tree has the following characteristics: 
Ø If fully completed, it provides an unequivocal answer to the 
question, “Will this intervention be effective here?” 
Ø To do that, it sets out all the conditions that have to be fulfilled 
for the intervention to make the contribution you want, both 
those about causal roles and those about support factors. 
Ø These conditions are set out by asking a question at each fork 
– is this condition met? – with two only branches: YES/NO. 
Ø If the answer is NO, you go no further. The question has been 
answered. The intervention won’t work. A necessary condition 
has not been met. 
 
• Negative effects and feedback loops. Interventions, even 
good ones, can figure in negative cakes, right alongside the 
positive ones. The negative cakes will certainly diminish the good 
effects of the intervention, and can even, if they are prevalent 
enough or strong enough, outweigh the good effects. You can 
sometimes unearth the negative effects by thinking through the 
causal process from beginning to end, step-by-step. This can be 
particularly important if any of the causal stages in between are 
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self-reinforcing, so that the outcomes, negative or positive, 
escalate over time. One good example of where worries about 
negative cakes and self-reinforcement have arisen was cited in The 
Munro Review of Child Protection (Munro 2011) and is shown in 
Figure 1.9, which is an example of yet another kind of causal map, 
a causal loop diagram.  
 
Figure 1.9. A causal loop diagram (Causal map type 3).  
Developed in collaboration with Professor David Lane  
(Henley Business School) 
The original interventions of increasing rules and guidance plus 
case management software were intended to improve the quality 
of help received by children, young people and their families by 
providing stricter guidelines for what social workers must do in 
dealing with children and families and by better monitoring of what 
they are doing. This involved ensuring that specific mandated facts 
about the family and the child were ascertained and recorded and 
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that various required meetings took place by a set time. But these 
interventions themselves, the Review argues, can have serious 
negative effects on child outcomes alongside the intended positive 
effects. How so? Through feedback loops that were positively 
reinforcing unwanted effects – vicious circles. 
If you increase substantially the amount of prescription that you 
impose on social workers, you reduce their ability to respond to 
the unique features of each child’s life. This, inter alia, can reduce 
their sense of satisfaction in their work. In the lower chains in the 
diagram, this increases staff sickness, absence rates and staff 
turnover rates. These effects can easily result in an increase in 
average social worker caseload, which then leads to social workers 
spending less time with the children and young people and their 
families. This in turn reduces the quality of the social workers’ 
relationships with the children and the families, which then 
reduces the quality of the outcomes. So the intervention may 
produce bad unintended consequences. Worse, these negative 
effects can become amplified via the feedback loops. When the 
outcomes are regularly too unsatisfactory, this reduces social 
workers’ sense of self-esteem and personal responsibility, and the 
vicious circle is set in motion again. 
The causal loop diagram shows you another of the benefits of 
thinking through the intervention process step-by-step: you may 
discover causal loops that will magnify the outcomes over time. 
Drawing the picture does not tell you whether it is the right 
picture. Nor does even a very accurate picture of this form tell you 
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what the support factors are for each stage to lead to the next, nor 
whether they are present, nor how to find that out. It tells you 
what the salient factor is at each step that is expected to play a 
causal role in producing the next step. And it contains no 
quantities, only the direction of effect. Its big advantage is that it 
reminds you of the possibility of negative effects alongside the 
positive ones, and it reminds you that the causal process may not 
be linear. Feedback loops may unexpectedly enhance the outcome, 
either for the good or for the bad.  
Causal maps: a review and a caution 
So far we have introduced three different kinds of causal maps. 
Let’s review what they are and what they are for. Causal maps are 
our chosen way of constructing causal narratives. On the account 
we give here, causal narratives can be seen to help with a number 
of interlinked questions. 
1. Is this child suffering significant harm and by whom (as in the 
case of Daniel Pelka who was abused by the mother and violent 
partner (Wonnacot & Watts 2014))?  
2. If yes, what intervention will provide best outcomes for the 
child and what might stand in the way of success? 
3. Given current circumstances, is significant harm likely to occur 
in future? (Mother has chucked out the violent partner, so does 
this reduce the probability of harm or is she likely to acquire 
another violent partner?)  
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4. If yes, what intervention will best stop the predicted harm?  
5. Are there reasonably possible changes in circumstances that, 
despite the intervention, might result in significant harm (violent 
partner might move back)? 
6. If yes, what if anything needs to be done to guard against the 
child thus being harmed?  
Causal maps, and the account of their functions which we have 
provided, help also to clarify what it is to identify a present harm 
(1. above), and how that differs from identifying a probable source 
of future harm that exists in the present family arrangements (3. 
above) or a risk (5. above). If you see a bad result, even before 
you try to understand how it is coming about, before you start to 
construct a causal map, you have identified a harm. But if you 
have observed a number of facts (including maybe that the 
boyfriend has moved out, but that may not be the end of the 
problems) and are trying to figure out what the result of them will 
be, you are trying to identify a possible future harm that exists in 
the present circumstances, even though there is no harmful result 
to observe, and for that you have to have a causal map. So too in 
the case of identifying a risk, meaning the case where your causal 
map tells you that if one of the facts changes (the boyfriend 
moves back in), the intervention may turn out to have failed to 
prevent the harm. 
In all these cases, your assessment will be deficient. These 
deficiencies may be most acute in the third case, of risk, for which 
the production of good enough causal maps requires even more 
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imagination. Causal maps come in a variety of different forms, 
highlighting different kinds of issues. You already have seen three 
examples of causal maps: cake diagrams, step-by-step graphs and 
causal loop diagrams. In drawing causal maps, you will of course 
only be doing your best. The causal processes are so complicated 
and your understanding of them is so limited and speculative that 
even if in the end you think your analysis is good enough, and 
hence so too your choice of intervention, and so too your 
prediction of its outcome, there will be gaps, uncertainties, 
guesses, in your assessment. This is why constant monitoring – 
keeping careful watch – that things are happening as you expect is 
crucial. 
So, as we indicated at the start, drawing up causal maps and 
thinking about how sure you can be about them will help you 
estimate as you go along how confident you can be in your 
explanations, predictions and interventions and what the dangers 
are that they will be wrong. It is unlikely that your assessment will 
or can take the form of a systematic analysis, with probabilities, of 
these uncertainties. But as you or you and your colleagues have 
thought about the problem, you will have become aware of the 
dangers that this or that step or link may be unreliable, how much 
it may matter if you have got it wrong, how and whether you can 
contingency plan against such a failure, and how, as you follow 
what is happening after you have intervened, you may be able to 
spot that things are going wrong and why. 
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Getting more sophisticated 
The kinds of causal maps we have described so far are only a 
sample of ones you might find useful. Different kinds of causal 
maps highlight different features of the causal processes 
responsible for the outcomes you ultimately see. It is difficult to 
illustrate everything you might want to think about in one single 
map. The more different kinds of features one wants to treat, the 
more complicated the maps become and the harder they are to 
read. But sometimes you will want something more sophisticated 
than you have seen so far here. Appendix 2 provides some further 
exemplars, especially of maps that combine different 
considerations discussed here. Do have a look there to see what 
kinds of things are available when you need them. 
What you can learn from “What Works” websites 
We have been providing strategies to help you think through what 
is happening to produce problems for the family and children and 
what might be the outcomes of actions you consider taking or that 
others may take in the future. There are various resource centres 
that can help in thinking about what interventions might help. In 
Appendix 1 we list a number of sites around the world that provide 
this service. This information can be very useful but, as we have 
already said, it is only a starting point, it cannot replace the need 
for thinking through the causal narrative of what is happening to 
the family and the child, what might happen in the future and 
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what would happen were one or another of these interventions 
adopted. 
Just what can you learn from websites on research evaluating 
intervention effectiveness like those in Appendix 1? The important 
thing to note about the studies vetted in these sites is that the 
results that are established with high degrees of confidence are 
averages: the average effect of the treatment across individuals. 
This matters to you in two different ways, the first of which is 
familiar, the second may be less so. 
Suppose, first, that you are thinking about an individual child or an 
individual family. You know that where there is an average, there 
is often a lot of variation that goes into that average. For some 
individuals who make up the average the results will be very good; 
for some, much less good; and for others still, the intervention 
may make matters worse. So you know you can’t just assume that 
the results for the child or the family you are dealing with will be 
close to the average. 
What is responsible for this variation? Whether you are considering 
interventions or causes of harm, one thing that certainly matters 
for the outcome for an individual child and his or her family is 
which of the support factors for that intervention or that cause are 
in place for that child and family and to what degree. And it can 
easily be shown that in any given population, the average outcome 
from a cause will depend on variations in the presence or strength 
of the support factors across the individuals in that population. 
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This is why it is so important for you to think through what you 
know of the support factors necessary for getting the effect in 
question and to map out how they stand with the specific child and 
family you are dealing with. 
Second, suppose you are thinking about a particular population of 
children and families. Maybe for instance you are considering 
making an intervention available in your district, such as the Triple 
P Parenting Programme for helping parents provide good care to 
their babies. Can you expect the same average in your population 
as in the study?  
What a study can establish is an average over the individuals in 
the study. Even if it is a very large study and very well conducted, 
the average is still only for the study population, in the 
circumstances in which the study was conducted.  
To think about the import of this it helps to recall what we said 
just, that the average treatment effect of an intervention in a 
study population is a function of the distribution in that population 
of the support factors that cooperate with the intervention to 
produce the outcome there – the other ingredients in the causal 
cake. And similarly, whatever average you will get in your 
population depends on the distribution of support factors that you 
have in your population. Both these claims are provable. But once 
you think about support factors these results are obvious. Some 
combinations of support factors help to improve the outcome far 
more than others and some may make it worse. The average 
Improving child safety 
 74 
outcome must depend on how these are distributed. And you 
cannot expect the same average in your population as in the study 
if your population has a different distribution of support factors 
than the study population has. 
You might think matters become easier if a number of studies 
have been done. But how? If they are done on very different kinds 
of populations and all have roughly the same result, this can be 
grounds for thinking the distribution of support factors is much the 
same across populations. This is the ideal case that those who 
design interventions aim for: they try to build into the protocol so 
many of the requisite support factors that the intervention is likely 
to work the same anywhere it is carried out according to the 
protocol. But this is very unusual. Generally, the results are 
different, and often very different.  
There are some statistical strategies that could be followed to deal 
with differences in studies on different populations. Perhaps one of 
the What Works sites has made available the results of a meta-
analysis across the studies. What that will essentially have done is 
to take the average of the averages. Or it may have been possible 
to construct some kind of curve for the distribution of the 
averages, in which case you might be advised to suppose that 
your population is a random draw from that curve. Should you 
adopt either of these strategies? That depends on what you know 
about what it takes to get the intervention to work, which depends 
in part on what you know about how it works. It also depends on 
what you know about your population and about how the support 
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factors it takes to get the intervention to work are distributed in 
your population. Perhaps if you know nothing at all, “take the 
average of the averages” or “do the random draw” is the best you 
can do. But then you should not be very confident in your 
predictions about what the average will look like in your 
population.  
If where your family will fit in the distribution of results – how near 
or far from the average and on which side – depends on support 
factors, what research results can help you identify these? Before 
considering that, let us remind you that scientific research is not 
all you need, and for some support factors you do not need it at 
all. Some of the support factors for a cause are obvious, so 
obvious in fact that it is easy to overlook them. As we have 
pointed out before, if parenting classes are in the evening some 
distance away and the buses don’t run there after 6 p.m., parents 
without cars may well have poor attendance. That’s why we try to 
focus your attention on the big slice in the cakes marked “other” – 
to remind you to think about these simple obvious but often 
overlooked factors. Other factors that matter for families like yours 
may have been noticed by other social workers working with 
similar families.  
When it comes to using research results, consulting the “logic 
model” or “theory of change” for an intervention, where it has 
been made available, can be helpful. The logic model for the 
intervention is supposed to do much of the work for you of 
constructing a causal narrative for what should happen if the 
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intervention is to be successful. It is supposed to lay out step-by-
step how the intervention is expected to produce its result. 
Thinking seriously about that process can help you figure out some 
of the things that your family and its environment would need to 
have in place if that process is to carry through properly. 
Increasingly you may also be able to turn to the What Works sites 
themselves. The Campbell Collaboration, for example, now have 
the more challenging motto not about “what works” but about 
‘what works, what harms, for whom, under what circumstances’ 
This is the kind of information that will help you make better 
decisions. We urge you to take it into account in your deliberations 
whenever it is available. And when it is not, press the What Works 
sites and research boards to put more effort into producing it.  
What we have not discussed here 
Dealing with the multiplicity of causal factors, as set out in Box 1.1 
in this chapter, is a central part of deciding what to do. But there 
are a number of problems that have to be dealt with before you 
get to this point that we are not discussing in this chapter. Here 
are five.  
• Comorbidity. Children and families in which there are 
concerns about the quality of the parenting often suffer from a 
variety of mutually reinforcing problems. It is rare to find in child 
welfare the paradigm case often believed to be met in medicine – 
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of a single problem that can be treated by a single intervention in 
isolation, without feedback and interaction with other problems 
and other interventions. So easy identification of a sole problem is 
not the norm. 
 
• Multiplicity of values and objectives, typically 
incommensurable. Particularly where there are multiple 
stakeholders, but not only then, what is to be achieved, what 
counts as success, is contestable. For example, parents and social 
workers may disagree on acceptable parenting styles. Again, the 
default medical case – where curing the disease is the readily 
agreed objective – is in child welfare a special or limiting case. So 
easy identification that we want to relieve this particular problem 
and of what would constitute success is not the norm. 
 
• Multiple participants. The child’s problem may be part a 
family problem, a community problem, a school problem. Each of 
these participants may matter as part of the causal structure of 
the problem and as a stakeholder whose interests have to be 
taken into account. So easy identification of, for example, the child 
as the sole stakeholder is not the norm. 
 
• Unintended consequences and side effects. Most policies 
and interventions will have these, some beneficial, many 
deleterious. And you need to think about them. The kinds of 
“causal maps” we introduced you to provide a framework for 
laying these out. But our hints and strategies may not be of much 
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help in filling in the maps. That's because our strategies are most 
useful for thinking about a particular identified effect and very 
often we have little idea what the side effects might be in order to 
start thinking about issues like what support factors enable their 
production. 
 
• Often the problems you confront are composed of a 
number of effects with possibly overlapping sets of causes. 
Some of the factors that contribute to them will be shared and 
others not. Don’t let our causal maps mislead you into thinking 
about single effects one at a time. Addressing causes that figure in 
multiple effects can be an efficient strategy for improving matters. 
On the other hand, these may not be the most accessible factors, 
nor the ones most open to change.  
The strategies we describe in this chapter are of most use when 
you are reasonably confident what problem you want to relieve 
and you are trying to think through the causes of it or evaluate 
different strategies to deal with it. It is much harder to evaluate, 
let alone think up, strategies to deal with comorbidity, multiple 
participants and multiplicity of values. Indeed, the last two are 
scarcely to do with causal principles. We discuss in greater detail 
in Chapter 2 on deliberation some of the consequences of these 
and other complications for the process of deciding what to do. 
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Conclusion 
In child welfare, you are dealing with complicated causal processes 
and this, we have argued, means that you cannot simply assume 
that an intervention that produced positive results in a study 
setting will work in the setting you might use it in. Although the 
task of using research findings is more challenging than many 
would like, we have offered guidance on how to handle the 
challenge. We have proposed a number of strategies for helping 
users create causal maps that bring out what factors are needed 
to make an intervention likely to succeed in the new setting. One 
recurrent theme in the strategies is the value of doing this as a 
group exercise, of seeking the views and insights of others. The 
strategies also underline that researchers need to provide a great 
deal more information about the context in which their study was 
conducted. 
The arguments of this chapter lead to an important conclusion 
about what we ought to expect from research, and the gap 
between that and what we get. The Campbell Collaboration’s aim 
to provide research on ‘what works, what harms, for whom, under 
what circumstances’ requires that professionals and practitioners 
be provided with relevant facts based on research about among 
other things the causal roles and supporting factors on which this 
chapter has concentrated. What we say in Chapter 2 on 
deliberation widens still further what we need from research if we 
are to make good decisions. It is plain that EBPP research at the 
moment by, for example, focusing heavily on RCT results, has a 
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much narrower focus than that you need to carry out your work. It 
is important that professionals and practitioners be more assertive 
in making clear what research should do to provide evidence for 
practical use.  
  23 
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CHAPTER TWO: DELIBERATION 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 talked about how to deliberate about what effects to 
expect from different courses of action. It was only about 
causation. Here we are going to talk about what good deliberation 
looks like more generally.  
To anticipate, the process of deliberation is more than just plain 
thinking. It is to do with reflectively and purposefully turning 
something over in your mind by making use of the insights 
provided not only by analysis but by intuition, emotion, 
experience, as well as the strategies and heuristics mentioned in 
Chapter 1.  We do not limit our definition of deliberation solely to 
analytic procedures. 
Nowadays deliberation is sometimes associated with “abduction”, 
that type of practical reasoning by which conclusions are inferred 
on the basis of information which is limited but the selection of 
which is not restricted by codified rules as to what is required for 
the inference to be valid. Despite sounding like “deduction” and 
“induction”, abduction is significantly different from either of them. 
With deduction and induction there are rules about what moves 
are acceptable. To challenge a deductive inference one can either 
question whether the premises are true or whether the rules of 
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inference have been followed properly. However, if neither of the 
two above are disputed, then it would be irrational to reject the 
conclusion of a deduction. In inductive reasoning, the premises are 
offered as support, not absolute proof, for the claim made in the 
conclusion, so the strength of the support they provide makes the 
conclusion more or less probable by familiar schemes of inference, 
many of which are taught in elementary statistics courses.  
Following such rules of inference has the seeming advantage that 
we know what to do: we draw the conclusion indicated by such 
rules. However, it has a closely associated drawback: rules of 
inference dictate not only what the outputs should be, but also 
what kinds of inputs to use. They say: from information like this 
draw this conclusion. So they necessarily limit the scope of what 
you consider. By contrast, when we deliberate abductively we do 
not restrict ourselves to pre-set inference schemes which, by their 
very nature, restrict the kinds of information we draw on. The idea 
is to put all the information we have together in the best way 
possible to make as coherent an account as possible, that is to 
create a credible narrative in the light of which a conclusion will 
become plausible. The causal narratives of Chapter 1 are an 
example. 
In the ideal, a narrative would make sense of all the facts we know 
in a coherent and reasonable way. In practice, we will almost 
always have to make do with one that is fairly consistent, covers 
most of the relevant information and is plausible (that is, which 
hangs together and portrays the human characters in a coherent, 
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believable manner). What matters is to recognise that a narrative 
should at least confront all the facts we can come by, of whatever 
kind, and that it can neither be constructed nor evaluated by rule. 
This, for example, is what professionals do when they try to decide 
how to deal with a referral alleging that a child is being 
maltreated. After gathering information about how the family is 
functioning, they will deliberate about how well the known facts 
support this allegation. What facts tell against it? What alternative 
explanation might fit all the known facts better? What facts that 
we don’t know might make a difference and how can we find them 
out?  
As with abduction, there are many aspects of deliberation that 
cause discomfort: its lack of precision, our inability to provide a set 
of rules to deliberate well, the fact that we can judge the 
plausibility of the final narrative that is constructed but cannot 
guarantee its truth. This means that no matter how careful we are, 
we can never predict the future with even near a hundred percent 
accuracy and thus will not be able to guarantee the safety of all 
children. 
Some see deliberation as a poor imitation of deduction and 
induction, a second-best that we have to use until we manage to 
find formal methods of reasoning that fit our particular problem 
area. However, we argue that deliberation is inescapable when 
dealing with the complexity of the social world. This is a point that 
will be readily acceptable to those involved in front-line practice in 
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child welfare services. Theorists and managers generally need to 
simplify the world to formulate precise theories or policies. 
However, those tasked with putting these theories or policies into 
action are more aware of, and have to take account of, the 
diversity of the real world and the complex interdependencies of 
human affairs. A policy may, for example, set out clear criteria for 
a potential user to be eligible for a service. However, few – if any 
– service users will match those criteria precisely and all will have 
other features that, to the front-line social worker, may make their 
need for the service more or less compelling. It would be wrong to 
exclude such features just because they are not covered by the 
pre-set criteria. 
To understand better the process of deliberation, we shall first give 
a brief summary of some current neuropsychological and 
neurophysiological theory about how human beings process 
information, that is, how we reason. This will provide a useful 
background for discussing how professionals interact with families 
and with each other, how they deliberate in professional practice, 
how this practice can be improved and its accuracy appraised.  
How humans reason 
It is broadly accepted that we reason in two distinct ways: intuitive 
and analytic. However, recent research in neuropsychology and 
neurophysiology gives us a greater understanding of how these 
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two kinds of reasoning function and helps overturn some of our 
deep-seated assumptions about rationality. 
We do indeed have two ways of processing information and hence 
of making sense of the world around us. Humans have two distinct 
minds within their brains: one intuitive and the other reflective.  
The intuitive mind is old, evolved early, and shares many of its 
features with animal cognition. It is the source of emotion and 
intuitions, and reflects both the habits acquired in our lifetime and 
the adaptive behaviours evolved by ancient ancestors. 
  
The reflective mind, by contrast, is recently evolved and 
distinctively human. It enables us to think in abstract and 
hypothetical ways about the world around us and to calculate the 
future consequences of our actions (Evans 2010). 
 
In practice, most cognitive tasks involve aspects of both our 
analytic and intuitive reasoning skills and, rather than viewing 
them as a dichotomy, it is more appropriate to think of a cognitive 
continuum, with different tasks using a different combination of 
each type (Hammond 1996). Intuition is sometimes presented as a 
mysterious process but its physical location and the features of the 
process are increasingly understood. It is only mysterious in the 
sense that it is generally an unconscious process that occurs 
automatically in response to perceptions, drawing upon memory 
and integrating a wide range of data to produce a judgement in a 
relatively effortless way. With developing expertise an individual 
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can draw upon an increasingly rich body of wisdom gleaned from 
experience. 
So, for example, the experienced professional recognises that the 
atmosphere in a family is cold and critical on the basis of 
experience and the unconscious observation of a number of cues. 
Intuition need not remain unconscious but can often be articulated 
to some degree, and it can often be improved with practice. 
Supervision of casework typically involves helping professionals 
draw out their reasoning so it can be shared and reviewed. 
Indeed, one of the features of professional practice in the helping 
professions is the need to explain and justify your reasoning to 
those receiving the service and to those who, on behalf of society, 
are checking your work, for example inspectors, judges and 
magistrates. This scrutiny has intensified since the 1980s as, for a 
variety of reasons, society has less trust in professionals (Power 
2007). Therefore, professionals cannot operate only at the level of 
intuitive understanding but need to be as explicit as they can.  
Analytic thinking, in contrast, is conscious and controlled. It uses 
data and rules to deliberate and compute a conclusion. It is 
restricted by memory and by its own processing capacity. It is 
time-consuming and effortful. It develops with age and is 
vulnerable to the ageing process. 
The dual processing capacity of the brain means that how we 
reason is not an “either-or” question. Emerging evidence supports 
the view that the intuitive system that provides quick, holistic 
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judgements is always in operation, and that these judgements are 
then ‘supplemented - or sometimes overridden - by the output of 
the more deliberate, serial and rule-based system’ (Gilovich, 
Griffin and Kahneman 2008). Kahneman, in his excellent summary 
of current thinking on this topic, points out how much this account 
of human reasoning differs from the general view in Western 
culture: 
In the unlikely event of this book being made into a film, 
System 2 [analytic thinking] would be a supporting character 
who believes herself to be the hero. The defining feature of 
System 2, in this story, is that its operations are effortful, and 
one of its main characteristics is laziness, a reluctance to 
invest more effort than is strictly necessary. As a 
consequence, the thoughts and actions that System 2 believes 
it has chosen are often guided by the figure at the center of 
the story, System 1 [intuitive reasoning] (Kahneman 2011). 
The differences between the two modes of reasoning are 
summarized in table 2.1. 
The importance of emotions 
Those working in the helping professions have always been aware 
of the importance of emotions in practice, but it is not so obvious 
what that importance amounts to, and whether and how emotion 
should enter into deliberation. 
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Intuitive reasoning Analytic reasoning 
• Unconscious and automatic 
• Large processing capacity 
• Draws on wealth of wisdom 
about the social world 
(including prejudices and 
discriminatory assumptions) 
and on expert knowledge 
• Looks for patterns 
• Emotion-laden 
• Fast: uses 
shortcuts/heuristics 
• Biased: because uses 
shortcuts/heuristics 
• Acquisition by biology, 
exposure and personal 
experience 
• Conscious and deliberate 
• Effortful 
• Slow 
• Limited capacity 
• Logical, linear thinking 
• Built on intuitive reasoning 
• Draws on formal knowledge 
• Can be readily made public 
• Acquisition by cultural and 
formal tuition 
 
Table 2.1 Differences between intuitive and analytic reasoning 
First, there is the easy point that the emotions of a family member 
– the anger of the mother or the depression of the father – may be 
a relevant fact that deliberation has to take account of in coming 
to a decision. It may be that anger must be controlled or 
depression treated if the family is to function better. The presence 
of certain emotions may also make the practitioner wonder what is 
going on in some circumstances. Why is the mother so angry? 
What is it about the behaviour of the child that is so intolerable?  
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Answering these questions may not be easy, but taking all these 
aspects into account should be uncontroversial: they should not be 
dismissed just because they concern emotions. 
However, what is more controversial is that the emotions of the 
practitioner deserve respect. Western culture has tended to see 
emotions as a nuisance, something that interferes with the 
operation of pure reason. However, much current thought in 
neuropsychology is now challenging this view and accepts that 
emotions are necessary for good reasoning (see, e.g., Damasio 
2008). Emotions prepare us for action. They help us to categorize 
the world and simplify the task of making sense of whatever we 
are dealing with. 
Emotions are different from feelings. A feeling is the private, 
mental experience of an emotion. According to Damasio, emotions 
are 
complicated collections of chemical and neural responses, 
forming a pattern; all emotions have some kind of regulatory 
role to play, […] emotions are about the life of an organism, 
its body to be precise, and their role is to assist the organism 
in maintaining life (Damasio 2008).  
A simple example of how emotions help us decide well is the fear 
that makes us recoil without thinking from the sight of a snake in 
our path. More generally, Damasio’s theory of emotions as 
“somatic markers” proposes that, when faced with a decision with 
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many options, emotions “mark” certain avenues as worth 
exploring, thereby directing attention and reducing the complexity 
of the task to a manageable size. The experienced professional, for 
instance, when considering how to intervene in a family, will select 
some options instantly as feeling more likely to be useful and so 
focus their attention on determining whether to use them.  
So if you feel disgust or anxiety, you should not dismiss such 
emotions as irrational. Rather, these emotions may be telling you 
something about what is going on, and you have to ask what it 
may be. That process can be conscious and maybe even 
systematic, but as it takes place, your emotions will remain in play 
– you may for example become more anxious as you get to see 
what produced your response, or you may become calmer as you 
realize that you misunderstood what the child said. Anyway, your 
emotions will continue to matter, and the task is not to explain 
them away but to see what information they are conveying to you. 
Certainly, emotions should not be ignored, but they should not be 
treated as authoritative either. It is not enough to assert that you 
know what you feel, what your instinct is. You have to check as 
best as you can whether the somatic marker is marking the right 
thing. Even in the apparently unequivocal case of the snake you 
must remember that it may be a stick.  
A third area in which emotions matter in deliberation is that of so 
called emotional intelligence. This is employed in listening and 
building empathy, understanding the effects of non-verbal 
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communications and of reaching self-awareness of how the work 
may affect you emotionally: 
It is increasingly clear that the most troubling and intractable 
situations exist when performance difficulties occur in the 
context of staff who lack accurate empathy, self-awareness 
and self-management skills… In the worst cases, these 
become almost ‘toxic’ in such a way that whole teams or even 
agencies can become enmeshed in the distorting dynamics 
surrounding the individual staff member (Morrison 2007). 
Similarly, emotions are automatic bodily responses. We do not 
choose to feel frightened if a service user threatens us. Our body 
reacts and this impinges on our thinking, whether we like it or not. 
If we do not acknowledge our fear, there is a danger that our 
intuitive reasoning will unconsciously target options that lead us to 
avoid seeing that person again, even if this is actually necessary 
for the safety of others.  
These points take up in a more constructive way the suspicion that 
emotions may indeed lead us astray. It is risky to make a decision 
when you are angry with a service user or resentful of a colleague, 
just as it is risky if you are tired or jetlagged. Box 2.1 summarizes 
the role of emotions in child welfare deliberation. 
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Box 2.1 The role of emotions in child welfare 
deliberation  
Emotions are an automatic response to cues in the 
environment, so we cannot simply advise people to have no 
emotional responses. 
 
Child protection work entails strong emotional reactions in 
practitioners and family members. Seeing a scared, unhappy 
child being threatened by a parent, or being a parent 
threatened with the possibility of losing their child, trigger 
powerful emotional responses. 
The potential for emotions influencing reasoning has long 
been recognised in the helping professions. Our emotional 
responses to a family can be a source of evidence about how 
it functions:  if feelings of despair or helplessness are 
triggered in an interview, this may be telling us about the 
mental state of the interviewee. They can also be harmful: 
feeling compassion for the mother making valiant attempts 
to solve problems regarding her child can prevent the 
professional from seeing that the quality of child care is still 
unacceptable. 
 
The considerable literature on working with emotions in 
professional practice echoes a point we have made before: 
share your responses with others and use them as a 
sounding board or challenger to minimize the chances that 
your emotions will distort your reasoning. 
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Common biases 
Analytic reasoning is slow and effortful while reasoning involving 
intuition and emotions is fast. This is possible because of the use 
of heuristics to simplify the calculations. These are rules of thumb 
that are very accurate but sometimes wrong. The “gut feeling” we 
can have when we make an intuitive judgement about a situation 
or person is worth paying serious attention to but should not be 
treated as infallible.  
There are a number of predictable ways in which professionals 
may err in child welfare work and there are also a number of 
strategies that can detect and reduce the incidence of such biases 
(Munro 1999). The most common biases found in child welfare are 
listed in Box 2.2. 
Individuals cannot stop themselves from having these biases in 
their reasoning but they can know that they occur and so can take 
steps to try and detect them. Box 2.3 lists some of the strategies 
one can employ to mitigate the common biases listed in Box 2.2. 
We shall return to the issue of bias when discussing how skill in 
deliberation is or can be developed.  
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Box 2.2 Common biases in child welfare 
• Confirmation bias: holding on to beliefs despite new 
information that tells against it 
• First impression bias: the first impression of a family can 
shape the future interpretation of information about them 
• Availability bias: being selective about what information to 
consider, with most attention being given to information that 
is vivid, concrete, emotion-laden or recent 
 
• The fundamental attribution error: the tendency to explain 
other people’s behaviour as due to internal personality traits 
with insufficient attention paid to the context in which they 
act 
 
• The hindsight error: once it is known what happened, there 
is a tendency to overestimate how obvious it was – or should 
have been – to people beforehand 
How professionals and family members interact  
Empirical research can be seen as fitting the analytic mode of 
reasoning: it aims to be explicit and logical. However, to use its 
findings in direct work with families involves having a relationship 
with family members. Talk of “relationships” in the helping 
professions is often linked in people’s minds with  
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psychotherapeutic methods of helping. We are, by contrast, using 
it in the much broader sense of an interaction between a family 
member and a practitioner. In this sense, having a relationship is 
not an option – a choice of how to interact – but an unavoidable  
Box 2.3 Common biases and deliberation 
Knowing that biases can occur does not stop you being 
vulnerable to them. All attempts at reducing them seek to 
notice and counter them rather than prevent them from 
happening. Most of the strategies involve trying to consider 
alternative perspectives or explanations and this is best 
achieved with help from others. 
• The confirmation bias pervades human reasoning and 
strategies to counter it typically take the form of requiring 
others, sometimes a designated “devil’s advocate”, to 
challenge a conclusion or argue for the opposite conclusion. 
• The availability bias can be reduced by asking professionals 
to consult checklists that help to capture the items they have 
overlooked. 
 
• The fundamental attribution bias can be lessened by 
thinking about what you might do in similar circumstances. 
• The hindsight error can be countered by seeking to 
understand what the world looked like at the time to the 
people taking the course of action that, with hindsight, 
seems so misguided.  
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dimension of working with other human beings. Children, young 
people and parents or carers are not inanimate objects on which 
we can have a one-way influence, but dynamic people who will 
interact with any practitioner, bringing their own interpretations 
and responses to the practitioner’s behaviour and words. 
Moreover, the type of changes sought in children’s services 
ultimately come down to family members altering their behaviour 
– to a mother, for instance, showing more responsiveness to her 
child’s emotional needs or a father learning to control his temper. 
Hence the work inevitably involves “working with”, not “doing to”, 
families to co-create the outcome. So the findings of research 
must be combined with the practitioner’s skills in interacting with, 
engaging, motivating and making sense of the material they are 
learning from a family. 
 
All solutions, however, have limited success. Intuitive reasoning 
produces a strong sense of confidence in our judgements; they 
“feel right” and this is hard to eradicate. 
The importance of the interaction between practitioner and family 
is widely accepted and indeed woven into most formal intervention 
methods. There is an extensive body of studies on several 
different kinds of populations that have concluded that outcomes 
in those populations depended heavily, possibly most heavily, on 
characteristics of the therapists (Lambert 2013). 
Being able to reach goal consensus with the service user seems to 
be a key ingredient of an effective working alliance: agreeing on 
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what change they wish to see, agreeing on what to do to get there 
and capturing the user’s buy-in to the plan.  
The importance of the service user as an active learner and 
problem solver has implications when using specific interventions. 
A persistent finding in research on user variables is that people 
vary considerably: in what they respond to positively, in how much 
effort they put in and in how quickly they respond to help. This 
strengthens our argument that complexity pervades child welfare 
work and that rules and procedures have only a limited 
contribution to make. 
The variability in responses creates a dilemma for EBPP: how 
much does the practitioner need to be responsive to the specific 
user he or she is working with, and how much responsiveness is 
possible, without moving so far from the intervention method that 
“fidelity to model” is lost? This is another area where deliberation, 
rather than some formal decision making process, is required. 
Deliberation in professional practice 
The above account illustrates the variety of factors that influence 
the way information is processed, that is, the way humans have 
evolved to have the capacity to integrate a large array of 
environmental indicators. The case study below taken from (Munro 
2008), describes a social worker's account of how she dealt with a 
referral. It illustrates the rich and varied way in which she used 
both analytic and intuitive reasoning and shows how she navigated 
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the cognitive continuum as she handled different aspects of the 
case, moving from an initial referral for a step-parent adoption to 
an assessment that the children were suffering maltreatment. 
A case study 
A couple, Doris (aged 44) and Ron (aged 49), had married two 
years previously and were now applying for a step-parent adoption 
of Doris’s two daughters by a previous marriage, Mary (aged 10) 
and Pamela (aged 6). The social worker, who was experienced in 
this type of referral, first made some standard background checks 
that revealed no adverse information and then made a home visit 
(italicized passages below are direct quotations from the social 
worker’s report. See (Munro 2008) for the references mentioned in 
these quotations): 
Even before I entered their home, it was apparent that 
orderliness was important to the family. The porch, windows 
and high perimeter fence were so new that the latter was still 
dripping with preservative. It occurred to me that these 
barriers might be to keep the world out as much as the family 
in. When I was only allowed to enter the home once I 
removed my shoes, and the adults talked proudly about the 
substantial refurbishments they had undertaken, it seemed 
that cleanliness was vitally important too. 
Ron was neat and tidy, wearing a cardigan and slippers, a 
slim, mild mannered, grey haired man with a cultured 
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speaking voice. He seemed eclipsed by the size and 
forcefulness of his wife – an articulate, middle-aged lady of 
heavy build. She was opinionated and forthright, talking of her 
dissatisfaction with ‘The Authorities’ and her pride in 
complaining. To reinforce this, she said she had transferred 
her children to another school when discipline was too lax; she 
changed her doctor when he would not prescribe medication 
she demanded. Although not directly stated, I received a clear 
warning about having to conform to Doris’ expectations. 
The couple then went on to speak vehemently about the need to 
discipline children and then told the social worker of the problems 
they were having with the younger daughter, Pamela, who was 
vomiting and soiling herself frequently, eating like an animal and 
displaying behavioural problems at school.  
Throughout, Doris talked aggressively and negatively about 
Pamela, describing her as ‘a beast, a hateful child, a horrible 
little brat’. 
The child was heard arguing with her sister and was summoned 
into the room by her mother: 
She had a rather waxen, pale complexion and dark shadows 
under her eyes and she cowered, hanging her head whilst her 
mother proceeded to criticise, harangue and shame her. 
The way the couple spoke of, and to, the girl was so unusual in a 
step-parent adoption case that the social worker felt very 
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suspicious and, after completing the initial interview, proceeded to 
make a thorough investigation of the family’s history and 
functioning. In doing this, she faced strong resistance from the 
mother: 
When asked, Doris was overtly hostile about providing details 
of family history and the references that are legally required 
for an adoption application. Conversations with her were like 
being drawn into a verbal maze, leading to dead ends where 
she looked blandly at me and asked ‘How can you expect me 
to remember after all this time?’ I was very careful not to 
enter into a confrontation with her, recognising that she was 
trying to set up a battle with me but eventually Doris 
responded to my request and produced amended police 
reference forms.  
With this basic factual information to guide her search, the social 
worker was able to make contact with several professionals who 
had had contact with the mother: social workers, teachers, general 
practitioners, adult and child psychiatrists, and police officers. She 
pieced together that the mother had a history of drug abuse and 
depression and had been diagnosed as having a ‘psychopathic 
personality disorder’. Also, two adult children had been removed 
permanently from her care in childhood because of physical and 
emotional abuse. Pamela’s schoolteachers were very concerned 
about her, regarding her as an unhappy, friendless little girl with 
behavioural and learning difficulties. 
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With this range of information, the social worker began to consider 
that Pamela might be the victim of emotional abuse but, first, 
discussed the difficulty of diagnosing emotional abuse: 
Authors generally agree that there is no one definition of 
emotional abuse. Gabarino et al. (1986) suggest that 
particular patterns of behaviour used by parents or primary 
caregivers cause emotional abuse and include rejecting or 
isolating behaviour, terrorising the child, ignoring him or her, 
corrupting or mis-socialising the child. Iwaniec (1995) offers 
the definition: emotional abuse can be overtly rejecting 
behaviour of carers or passive neglect. Carers who 
persistently criticise, shame, rebuke, threaten, ridicule, 
humiliate, put down, induce fear and anxiety, who are never 
satisfied with the child’s behaviour and performance (and do 
so deliberately to hurt the child) are emotionally abusive and 
cruel. Equally those who knowingly distance themselves from 
the child by ignoring signals of distress, pleas for help, 
attention, comfort, reassurance, encouragement and 
acceptance are emotionally abusive and neglectful. Research 
by Benoit et al. (1989) shows that 96 per cent of emotionally 
abused children have interactional problems with their 
mothers. Iwaniec’s own study (1983) suggested that children 
subject to emotional abuse have serious attachment 
problems. 
Pamela’s early years had been problematic. She had been 
conceived after her mother’s first marriage had ended. The 
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father deserted Doris in the early stages of the pregnancy. 
Doris said she had never bonded with her daughter. 
In considering the prerequisites for healthy psychological 
development, Bowlby (1984) states the need for secure 
attachment. Similarly, Erikson et al. (1989) reiterate that 
unless a child receives appropriate love and positive 
encouragement from infancy onwards it is impossible to make 
the necessary psychological progress from one developmental 
stage to another, which ultimately results in a ‘whole’ 
personality. Both Skuse (in Meadows 1997) and Adcock 
(1995) suggest that a repeated cumulative pattern of 
persistent verbal abuse in a low warmth/high criticism 
environment is more damaging than an isolated, injurious 
incident. I was beginning to form a picture of Pamela living in 
such circumstances. 
The mother’s history of conflict with professionals suggested that 
she would not work in partnership with the local authority. It was 
feared that a precipitous move into a formal child abuse 
investigation might antagonise her to the extent that she might 
refuse further contact, making it harder to collect sufficient 
evidence to warrant coercive intervention. The social worker 
therefore continued contact on the basis of pursuing the step-
parent adoption, asking to interview the two girls without the 
parents present, as would be usual in such a case: 
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Although Pamela had not been advised of my visit she readily 
engaged with me. Both girls were serious and earnest. We 
talked minimally about adoption – I deliberately played this 
down – and primarily about the children’s day-to-day life. 
They confided that they get into trouble at home where 
punishments are severe. Both described how each, but 
Pamela especially, is excluded ‘for weeks at a time’ to her 
bedroom. They said they exasperated their mother and the 
adults responded by hitting them with a stick, leaving red 
welts on their palms. The girls agreed that Pamela got the 
worst of it, sometimes beaten on her bottom too. I was 
bothered that the children told a complete stranger about this 
so soon after meeting them, and wondered aloud what they 
thought might happen if the adults knew of this conversation. 
The girls were uncertain but explicit that they wanted me to 
know although they did not expect me to do anything about it.  
I weighed up how I might deal with this situation. Would 
confronting the adults result in a greater risk of physical abuse 
to the children after I had left the home? I decided it could do 
so, so instead queried the level of ‘chastisement’ that the 
adults use, without being more specific. They said the worst 
punishment they use, after withholding of privileges, is 
sending the girls to their bedrooms. 
The social worker concludes that the children are experiencing a 
significant level of physical and emotional abuse. She weighs up 
the risk of this abuse continuing or escalating, using Greenland’s 
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(1987) and Browne and Saqi’s (1988) lists of risk factors, and 
judges that the mother, Doris, poses a very high risk as an abuser. 
She also notes the history of this family and how similar the 
current picture is to twenty years ago, when Doris’s eldest son was 
removed from her because of abuse. Her decision that the case 
needs to be dealt with as a child protection investigation means 
the end of her involvement, the case being transferred to a child 
protection team, who will have to decide whether to try and 
preserve the family. Is there any therapeutic option that can be 
offered with a significant chance of success or should the decision 
be to repeat history and remove the girls? 
The social worker concludes her case study by considering the 
parents’ motivation. She is puzzled that they sought an adoption 
order and thus exposed themselves to scrutiny, particularly in light 
of the mother’s previous, hostile contact with Social Services in 
relation to her older children. She speculates that the diagnosis of 
“psychopathic personality disorder” may be relevant: 
My understanding of psychopathic personalities is not only 
that they are antisocial but that true psychopathic 
personalities are unable to appreciate or anticipate the 
consequences of their actions. Consequently, I speculated that 
maybe Ron did not know all the history and that Doris had not 
realised the impact this history would have on the application. 
Alternatively, perhaps this couple are so exasperated with 
Pamela that they cannot tolerate living with her but to request 
her removal from their home would not sit easily with their 
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religious beliefs. Is their hidden agenda for the local authority 
to remove her ostensibly against their wishes? 
What we might learn from this case study 
This account of a case reveals the complexity of making sense of 
what is happening in a family and deciding what to do. Formal, 
explicit knowledge plays a significant role. The social worker was 
operating within a formal framework of law and procedures that 
shaped her duties and powers. She was using formal theories of 
child development and adult mental disorder. She cites empirical 
evidence on the impact of particular forms of parenting behaviour 
on children. She uses research on risk factors to help her weigh up 
the level of danger for the children. Intuitive reasoning is also 
apparent. As the social worker approaches the house, she notes 
the pattern of evidence presented about the importance of 
cleanliness, comparing this house with some standard of the 
average level of tidiness. In interviewing the parents, particularly 
the mother, she is making swift, intuitive judgements of what is 
going on and adapting her own behaviour accordingly. In talking to 
the children she draws on her expertise in communicating with 
youngsters and in talking about sensitive issues. The social worker 
is open about her emotional reactions to the work: she finds the 
mother threatening and aggressive, the younger girl is sad and 
arouses her compassion. The case also clearly illustrates how the 
social worker’s mode of reasoning changed as she moved from 
direct contact with the family – where the speed and richness of 
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intuition were most needed – to the later stages of reflecting on 
her assessment and making decisions, when analytic skills become 
more dominant.  
Research on professionals’ reasoning suggests that this social 
worker is fairly typical in her use of both analytic and intuitive 
reasoning and of explicit and implicit knowledge. If anything, she 
is more able than average to formulate her use of theory and the 
steps in her reasoning (Secker 1993, Walker et al. 1995, Marsh 
and Triseliotis 1996).  
This account is very lengthy but length is necessary to illustrate 
the detailed reasoning that is involved. The analysis is discursive 
and unsystematic. It is personal – what the professional sees from 
using her eyes and ears when faced with the people she has to 
decide about. It is heavily contextual – she is the person on the 
spot who has to identify and assess the facts that she needs to 
respect to make a decision, and she and only she can make that 
good, whatever hints and help she may get from policy 
recommendations, best practice or professional standards. 
Here is a partial list of what she takes into account: 
• Nothing wrong with the background checks 
• Very clean and orderly house 
• Opinionated and forthright mother 
• Noisy arguing 
• Feeling suspicious 
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• Avoiding confrontation 
• A picture of Pamela living in such circumstances. 
It is easy to extend this by taking more from the detail of the case 
study, but even this partial list gives some indication of both the 
number and the variety of types of pieces of information that are 
used in deliberation. It involves making sense of a large amount of 
material.  
That very material should also include what are often referred to 
as values or moral considerations. Because deliberation is about 
everything that should be taken into account, what is right and 
wrong should certainly matter and is not to be excluded on the 
grounds that it is “subjective”. Whether, for example, an 
intervention in a family is too compromising of their autonomy is 
certainly something that deliberation, in our sense of reflection 
among a group of professional people, should encompass. 
Questions such as whether it is morally wrong to ignore the results 
of research in making a decision about an intervention also matter 
here. 
It is important though that there are some limits to what material 
should be included in the full exercise of deliberation. The process 
is indeed open-ended in that there are no clear rules which tell you 
beforehand what may turn out to be relevant. Nevertheless, 
practitioners will not take into consideration, for example, the 
predictions of astrology. Deliberation is, among other things, about 
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what is relevant. It is therefore as much about excluding material 
as letting it in. 
The visit reported in this account does not of itself result in a final 
decision about what action to take – that is for later discussion in 
the child protection team. Yet it includes a variety of conclusions, 
each of which requires a decision that this is what is happening 
and that it should be characterised in this way – in the end, that 
the children are experiencing a significant level of physical and 
emotional abuse. So deliberation is directed towards a final 
decision – what intervention we favour – but it also includes, as a 
necessary preliminary to that decision, a multiplicity of decisions 
which result from deliberation. Box 2.5 describes what deliberation 
is then like. 
For comparison, look at an example of tight reasoning taken from 
(Munro 2008) – a decision tree for making a child welfare decision 
(Figure 2.1). This decision making tool requires the practitioner to 
set out systematically what interventions are available for helping 
a boy named Nat, to identify what the possible outcomes of each 
such intervention are, to estimate how likely each outcome is and 
to give a number from 1 to 12 to indicate the utility (value) of 
each outcome. That done, the arithmetic calculates the overall 
score for the end of each branch – the final outcome – by 
combining the probability of an outcome with its value. They can 
then be ranked in terms of preference. In this case, Residential 
unit wins with 5.93, followed closely by Secure unit with 5.38, so 
that the decision is to use the former. 
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Box 2.5 What deliberation is like 
It contains a variety of heterogeneous facts and opinions, 
arrived at by a variety of routes including factual, instinctive, 
imaginative, speculative and research or check-list informed. 
The process of composing a list of relevant details is open-
ended. There are no rules to tell you which facts are 
relevant, nor how you are to assess their truth. 
 
The absence of rules means that there is no sure way of 
putting the choice of relevant facts and of the methods used 
to arrive at them beyond controversy. 
 
The absence of proof does not mean the absence of good 
reason and good reasoning. 
 
Since there are no established procedures for deliberating 
against which a particular decision can be judged, ex post 
audits of a decision, such as take place when the decision 
was wrong, find it easy to see arbitrariness and lack of 
objectivity in the process.  
 
Deliberation is about a particular decision, in a particular 
context. The context does more than provide the facts which 
are relevant to applying the code. The context is what you 
have to inspect to decide what facts are relevant and true. 
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This comparison reveals a stark difference between the two 
examples of reasoning. When compared with the tight and 
formulaic decision tree, it is not surprising that many find the 
example of deliberation problematic, so that the advice that we 
should deliberate rather than use formal decision making 
techniques causes anxiety. By contrast, the decision tree is 
reassuring. It purports to tell you, by use of systematic analysis 
and quantification, what the best intervention is. It is indeed true 
that if those were the utilities, and those the probabilities, and 
those the only interventions available, it would make no sense to 
say that, for example, leaving Nat with his family is better than 
putting him in a residential home. The result has therefore been 
arrived at impersonally – it does not matter who does the 
calculation. We thus seem, by the use of this tool, to have 
achieved objectivity, proved what is the optimum, eliminated 
uncertainty and forced consensus. However, this prize can be 
gained only when most of the hard work has already been done by 
deliberation. What the alternative courses of action are has to be 
thought through before you draw up the tree. You have to 
estimate the probabilities. Above all, you have to attach utilities to 
the outcomes. Notice that Residential unit scores more than 
Secure unit mainly because in that case Successful move scores 8, 
whereas Successful move scores only 7 in a Secure unit. That is no 
doubt because the law and our respect for autonomy count a good 
result achieved with less coercion as better. That may be right, but 
there is nothing impersonal, objective or beyond doubt about it. 
Similarly, the outcome with the highest score is Satisfactory care  
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Figure 2.1: A decision tree for making a child welfare decision 
Copes
Utility
value
Copes
Copes
Copes
Suffers harm
Suffers harm
Suffers harm
Suffers harm
Successful move
Successful move
Successful move
Successful move
Successful move
Unsuccessful move
Unsuccessful move
Unsuccessful move
Unsuccessful move
Unsuccessful move
Satisfactory
Continuing concerns
Continuing concerns
Satisfactory care
Absconds
Absconds
Absconds
Absconds
Co-operates
Co-operates
Fails to co-operate
Fails to co-operate
Fails to co-operate
SettlesFoster home
Family
Residential unit
Secure unit
Where should 
Nat be placed?
0.005
0.75
0.245
0.1
0.7
0.2
0.6
0.15
0.25
0.9
0.01
0.09
0.9
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.8
5.38
5.93
2.4
1.53
1.3
3.2
5.5
1.3
4.5
7
1.3
4.2
5.8
1.3
4
1
7
3
7
3
4
1
8
3
8
3
4
1
8
3
6
2
4
1
9
3
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with the family. Deciding that that has the highest utility is not 
simply a matter of calculation nor of analysis but of values about 
the importance of birth family bonds. 
A familiar word to describe the skill which people are using when 
they decide that the family solution is the best but cannot justify 
their decision by analysis of a proof-like, incontrovertible kind, is 
“judgement”. If deliberation requires sorting through a myriad of 
possibly relevant alternatives, the facts that may be relevant to 
their success or value, all being heterogeneous in their nature and 
requiring different kinds of support, it is good judgement that you 
need in order to deliberate well. Put like that, the word 
“deliberation” is defined solely in terms of what it is not – it is not 
analysis, etc. However, it does point to an important distinction.  
Take probabilities. A favourite pedagogic device for explaining the 
notion of Decision Trees is to take two urns, both containing a 
mixture of black and red balls, and specify what reward you get for 
picking a red and for picking a black from the first urn, and what 
reward you get from the second urn. You have to decide which urn 
to pick from. The decision tree in Figure 2.2 tells you what to do. 
This looks just like, only simpler than, any one of the sections in 
the Nat decision tree attached to each of the alternative 
interventions. It has probabilities (the top one is 0.6) and a payoff 
or utility (the top one is £100). So too, in the Nat case, the top 
outcome has a probability (0.1) and a payoff (4). These similarities 
are deceptive. To insert the probabilities into the urn tree you just  
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Figure 2.2: A decision tree for picking balls out of an urn 
have to know how the game has been set up. That is all you need 
to know to get the payoffs. You do not have to decide what to put 
in, except in the most impoverished sense. On the contrary, in the 
case of deciding what is best for Nat you have to do all the work. 
You have to think, speculate about, guess, reflect on, discuss, 
even calculate, and in a word deliberate about, and then decide 
what numbers to put in. Research can help you here with some 
statistics – for example, how many children abscond from 
residential care – but you still need to move from that average to 
estimating a probability for the specific child Nat. There are no 
rules of the game, or if there are, we don’t know them in advance. 
You do that by exercising judgement, meaning only that you have 
to decide on a figure without just going to the rules of the game or 
any other guide to how to work it out. In this case, you really do 
have to decide what to put in. 
Urn A red ball £100
0.6
0.4
0.8
0.2
Urn B
Decision
black ball £200
red ball £400
black ball £0
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Because the rules of the two-urns game have been set up before 
you start, you have no work to do and, in games like this, the 
rules about how it works are univocal. Therefore, it is of course 
true that deciding which urn to go for has all the attractive 
qualities of certainty and rule-following that we set out. The use of 
this tool has achieved objectivity, proved what is the optimum, 
eliminated uncertainty about the result (through the availability of 
clear probabilities) and forced consensus.  
The Nat tree cannot give you that. It can give you a systematic 
way of getting you to consider all the possible options, their pros 
and cons, how they are meant to work, the facts you need to bet 
that they will, how you get and verify those facts, before you fill in 
the decision tree. Doing all that we call “deliberating”, and it 
requires using all the tools and insights we have set out in this 
book. Each of those tools often or typically requires the exercise of 
judgement, meaning deciding what is relevant or true (or 
whatever else you have to decide as you deliberate) without rules 
or procedures which provide certainty, nor even clear probabilities. 
The result of the urn tree is not to be doubted. You should choose 
urn A. Not to do so is, in terms of the game as set up, 
incomprehensible. That is the same as with deduction. Take the 
classic syllogism: 
All men are mortal. 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 
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Given that the deduction game is set up as it is, it is also 
incomprehensible that you should not agree that Socrates is 
mortal, once you agree that both premises are true. Less 
compellingly, when reasoning inductively, it is hard to understand 
why you should not believe that the sun will rise tomorrow and 
why you don’t think that the fact that it always has done so is a 
good or convincing reason for thinking that it will.  
The philosopher David Hume had doubts about the logic of 
induction. But his doubts are nothing compared with the flaws in 
the logic, or the lack of logic, of deliberation. It is plain that it is all 
too easy to comprehend why one person or group might decide 
otherwise than another, if the decision has been the product of 
deliberation and the exercise of judgement. There are often 
reasonable alternative answers to many of the questions about all 
the possible options, their pros and cons, how they are meant to 
work, the facts you need to bet on that they will, how you get and 
verify those facts, which can cumulatively produce quite different 
decisions, without those answers being demonstrably wrong rather 
than just contestable. There is often no way to resolve such 
contests, even between intellectually and otherwise honest people. 
This difficulty in reaching consensus and proof for a conclusion 
where deliberation is inevitably required is reflected in the law, 
where the standard of proof required in the family courts is lower 
than in the criminal court – “the balance of probability” rather than 
“beyond reasonable doubt”. 
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This is seen in child protection cases where there are sincerely 
held but inconsistent views on what to do to best help the child 
among the professionals who are working with a family. 
Sometimes, discussion that clarifies each person’s reasoning leads 
to a resolution but, at times, the disagreement is irresolvable. 
Discussion can at least help each other understand where the 
disagreement comes from but if, for instance, one person 
considers that adoption will be better for the child than a kin 
placement, there is no simple fact of the matter that can 
determine whether this is right or not. What counts as “better” in 
terms of a child’s overall development can be, and is, disputed. 
Deliberation is also needed in most versions of EBPP but seems to 
be disliked, or at least ignored, by some. EBPP has typically meant 
advising people to use the “best evidence” from research together 
with their local clinical knowledge and the user’s preferences. This 
clearly cannot be done by some rote process but requires the 
professional to weigh up the competing claims of very different 
types of information. In the growing tendency to shift from talking 
of evidence-based practice to evidence-based practices, one can 
see an attempt to reduce the scope for individual thinking and 
create a more mechanized process for deciding what to do. 
However, simplicity comes at a high price. By excluding local 
wisdom and users’ views, you also exclude consideration of some 
key factors for success or failure thereby reducing the probability 
of effective help being given (see Box 2.6). Moreover, such an 
approach raises ethical concerns, as we will discuss later.  
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Solving complicated and complex problems 
It should be clear from the previous discussion, and in particular 
from Chapter 1 on causation, that the process of deciding what to 
do about a child with problems is often difficult. The difficulty is of 
a particular kind: it arises from a problem being complex. 
Complex, as the term is coming to be used in EBPP circles, means 
something different from, and for the present purpose more 
daunting than, its near relation complicated. Jet engines are 
complicated. They are composed of very many interconnected 
parts and processes, which combine systematically to produce 
propulsive power. For lay people, this means that in practice we do 
not understand in detail how they work. But that is only because 
they are complicated. There exist people – specialist engineers – 
who understand perfectly well how they work. There are 
blueprints, which set out with precision how the parts and  
Box 2.6 Thinking together 
Members of the family and of the professional network will 
have different pieces of the picture to inform an 
understanding of the problem and the decision on what to 
do.  
Sharing the process of deliberation with others allows 
information and ideas to be offered and provides critical 
challenge that picks up on the biases and inconsistencies in 
your thinking. 
Improving child safety 
 120 
processes combine. Very occasionally an engine malfunctions, but 
it is almost always possible to say what has gone wrong and how 
the problem should be remedied. This is shown by the typical 
result of an accident that the engine type, even if temporarily 
withdrawn from operation, is quite quickly reapproved for use. The 
chances that the remedy is mistaken are low because of the 
detailed understanding of the processes involved. 
Complicated problems, i.e. problems about complicated systems, 
can be solved. When we think about these problems, the 
procedure is predominately systematic – we proceed through the 
options by proceeding through the system – and it is conscious, as 
is shown by the fact that, as engineers look for the fault, they can 
answer the question “What are you doing and why?” by referring 
to the way the system works as set out in the blueprint. Because 
of this, it is a complete answer.  
Of course, dealing with a fault in a system like this is not, in 
practice, as blindly systematic as just inspecting the engine from 
beginning to end with the blueprint in hand until you find the fault 
and put it right. Although you could do that, it is what you would 
do only if you were baffled – the fault might be anywhere and of 
any kind. In practice, skilled engineers (and the term “skilled” 
refers here to being able to jump to at least provisional 
conclusions better than you or I could) will decide to start in a 
particular place, either because it is obvious – the fan blade has 
broken – or because their experience tells them that it is probably 
a fuel problem. They cannot answer the question, “Why did you 
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start there and why?” by referring to the blueprint. To that extent, 
they will set about the problem by using skill, judgement and 
intuition, and that process is unsystematic in the full sense that we 
have illustrated. 
We set out above an account of an adoption problem to show how 
very different many child welfare cases are. One way of putting it 
is that, of course, engineers looking for where the fault lies have to 
think about the problem, but how much thinking they have to do is 
much reduced by the fact that the engine is only complicated and 
that they have the blueprint. Child welfare officers deciding what 
to do about a particular child or family cannot set about the 
problem by asking, “Where is the blueprint for this system and 
where should I start to look to find out what has gone wrong and 
how to fix it?” Their problem is more than just complicated. It is 
complex. 
The complexity of child welfare decisions arises in at least two 
ways. First, we have no consensus about what we should do, 
except at a level of such generality (e.g. “Do the best in the 
circumstances.”) that the answer gives no operational purchase on 
the question. What are the criteria for assessing what would be a 
good intervention, if a good intervention is available? The best for 
the child? For the family? For the child’s physical health?  For his 
or her emotional development? All of these are good things. The 
law gives some guidance on how to prioritise competing values. 
For example, English law states that children are best cared for in 
their own families, if possible. This is, though, of limited help. 
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Professionals do not ignore competing values or the needs and 
rights of all involved; they weigh them up and come to an answer 
which they think best addresses them.  
Second, we have to find or create and use stories about cases like 
this, and hence about what is and might happen here, which play 
the same role in our decision-making as the blue print of the 
system did for the engineer. In other words, the stories lead us to 
a conclusion about what has gone wrong and what we should do. 
However, the process of getting to that story requires thinking 
about the problem much more widely and imaginatively than is 
required of the engineer who has a blueprint to consult. So we 
distinguish the thinking that the engineer has to do from the 
thinking that the child welfare officer has to do by calling the latter 
deliberation. This is to give it a name that draws attention to the 
consequences of complexity for how you have to think.  
Mention of a story links with the reference in Chapter 1 to thinking 
about the complex causal processes through the use of “causal 
narratives”. This idea –  that in deliberating about a problem we 
are trying to write a story, or construct a narrative – is helpful.  
Take the analogy of a detective story. The detective comes to the 
case and needs to decide somehow what he knows, what he wants 
to know and how all he knows or gets to know fit together to make 
an explanation of what happened. These needs are interconnected 
– what he makes of what he knows, what he wants to know, 
depends on what story he is trying to test. In traditional detective 
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stories of the country-house type, the detective ties up all the 
loose ends in the last chapter and explains how this or that 
apparently dissonant fact after all makes sense in the final story. 
Similarly, solving a jigsaw puzzle results in a clear picture with no 
left over pieces (and a jigsaw is even less like real-life than a 
detective story, because you know from the start that the pieces 
you need to make the picture are all in the box and that you have 
to use all of them). 
Narratives about child welfare problems are, alas, not as neat as 
that. First, as we have said, you have to deliberate about what you 
are trying to do and why, about what matters. The detective 
knows what matters – solving the case. Second, you will not 
typically tie up all the loose ends. There will be inconsistencies, 
things you cannot take account of properly, a nagging feeling that 
maybe you have missed something. Third, in child welfare you are 
usually working with several family members, each of whom has 
his or her own point of view that has to be explored and taken 
account of in the final understanding reached.  
So a good narrative is unlikely to be perfect (see Box 2.7), and if 
you only act when you have a perfect narrative, you will often be 
unable to act. The idea of a narrative, a good enough narrative to 
proceed with – though with caution – is at the heart of the notion 
of deliberation.  
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Box 2.7 Sources of complication and complexity 
• No single cause, no single cure of family problems 
• Different values among those concerned with a family and 
its problems, what is to be achieved, what counts as success, 
what course of action has the best cost-benefit ratio 
 
• Multiple participants who may influence the sequence of 
events when help is provided 
 
• Any intervention is only one of the many things going on 
in the life of a family. 
 
• Though there are commonalities, all families and all 
children are different and may respond very differently to the 
same interventions. 
 
• Things happen that you may have had little reason to 
expect or would not have been able to find out about had 
you tried. 
Why do people want objectivity? 
If things go wrong, it can be appropriate to criticize the result of 
deliberation because certain facts were ignored or insufficient 
effort was made to collect appropriate facts. Criticism can also be 
appropriate if not all practicable precautions were taken to guard 
against biases of judgement or if decisions were not discussed with 
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others who may have different points of view. This is also, of 
course, appropriate for clear cases of bad judgement, though 
sometimes, due to very bad luck, matters go wrong despite our 
best efforts to construct an accurate narrative. Just as there are 
no conclusive criteria for labelling one narrative as “the right one” 
at the start, so too there are no conclusive criteria for evaluating 
after the fact how, or that, things should have been decided 
differently. Since judgement is inevitable in cases of what we are 
calling complexity, it makes no sense to blame the process on the 
grounds that it was “not objective”. 
Yet the unease aroused by the notion of deliberation is often 
expressed in terms of its apparent failure to achieve objectivity. 
This notion is typically not used very precisely, but like logical – 
which rarely means anything very rigorous (such as based on a 
deductive or similar process of inference, or having its own logic) – 
it is used to gesture toward the hope that it should be possible to 
provide a conclusion based more on systematic and proof-like 
reasoning and less on the personal choices of a particular 
individual or group.  
We believe that there is something wrong with the whole idea of 
objectivity as commonly used in EBPP. A good deal of what we 
mean will be apparent from what we have said earlier in this 
chapter. We want now to bring that all together, and we start by 
considering why people want objectivity so much in the first place. 
We shall go on to show how it will not give them what they want: 
some of it is unachievable, some better achieved by deliberation. 
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This is not just a “be realistic” argument. There are indeed 
practical difficulties in the way of achieving objectivity in the sense 
suggested by the usual understanding. But so there are in 
deliberating well and indeed in using any procedure for deciding. 
The superiority of deliberation and the problems with objectivity go 
deeper than that. 
“Objectivity” can be seen as shorthand for the product of a 
systematic, proof-like, impersonal and open, i.e. transparent, 
procedure for deciding. Each of these virtues is an important part 
of what makes people want objectivity. They want a rule-based 
process that 
• Prescribes what to do and how to do it: Systematic 
• Produces an incontrovertible result: Proof-like 
• Will be carried out identically and with the same result whoever 
does it: Impersonal 
• Can be audited if, heaven forbid, error or disagreement appear: 
Transparent  
 
If these features are present, then 
• We have an agreed upon criterion for whether the decision 
based on this procedure is a good one – roughly, that the 
procedure followed the rules. 
•  We have eliminated certain kinds of error – those arising from 
personal failings such as incompetence, undeclared prejudice or 
individual interest. 
Chapter Two: Deliberation 
 127 
• Consequently, we have eliminated certain kinds of uncertainty 
about the validity of the result – those arising from the possibility 
of such errors. 
 
That said, there are certain evident oddities about the story so far. 
Maybe they are no more than surprises – meaning that, if this 
type of objectivity can be achieved, they will turn out to be a list 
not of defects, but merely of what we did not expect. Here are 
these oddities: 
• If the criterion of success is that the procedure has been 
followed, then there are no reasons to look at the outcome by 
itself to assess its quality. It makes no sense to consider the truth 
of the conclusion of a deductive argument “Socrates is Mortal”, 
because its truth is guaranteed by the truth of the premises. 
• The process surely cannot be entirely impersonal. Even 
following the rules has to be done by somebody. Perhaps what is 
meant is that it could be done by any person, or by a computer, 
without loss. So the particular person who carries out the process 
is only the location of a calculation. 
• It looks heroically optimistic to claim that the adoption decision 
in our case study of Doris and Ron could be reduced to rules. 
• A prediction based on the systematic and impersonal operations 
of a computer programme will not eliminate uncertainty if, as it 
must in child welfare, it includes handling probabilities, and it will 
often produce errors, in the sense of wrong predictions. There is 
no way of being sure of getting the future right. 
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However, we say that these oddities are more than just a list of 
surprises. They point at serious defects in the idea of objectivity as 
typically understood above, what it can offer and what we can 
expect of any decision process. Just as there is no infallible way of 
being right about the future, so there is no procedure that, 
through being systematic, impersonal, proof-like and transparent, 
will guarantee, or even provide a good chance of achieving, what 
we hope for from a good decision process. Here are the 
considerations that support this conclusion. 
First, procedures such as decision trees achieve their purity by 
assuming that the dirty work (in the example given, of establishing 
the options, the utilities and the probabilities) has already been 
done. All they do is provide a certain kind of consistency. That is 
indeed proof-like, but this way of proceeding deals with only a 
small part of what you have to do. 
Second, the rest – the dirty work – does not look as though it will 
yield to proof-like procedures, even if such procedures may be 
useful here and there. For example, a very well conducted RCT or 
an econometric study may provide something very conclusive 
about what caused that outcome there, or what the causal 
mechanism may be in the study population. If we look at the 
process of deliberation exemplified by the adoption case and the 
variety of resources (such as emotional understanding), 
techniques (such as empathy), circumstances (such as familial 
conflict) that have to be taken into account, there seems to be 
little chance that such a procedure is available. Whether that is 
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because the world is unmanageably disorderly (e.g. full of 
incommensurability), or because we are incapable of seeing it 
otherwise, is of no practical importance. The onus of proving that 
such procedures can be developed is on those who hope to use 
this feature of objectivity. The evidence of our experience, and of 
what we can actually do, is otherwise. 
Third, and in particular, it does not seem likely that one example 
of an objective procedure – deduction – is available in practical 
matters. The thus far vain attempt to construct practical 
syllogisms shows again how the dirty work cannot be avoided. A 
syllogism such as:  
Adoption works for children with these particular 
characteristics in these particular circumstances. 
This is such a child.  
Therefore, recommend adoption. 
 
is reassuring in just the way the Socrates syllogism was. However, 
unlike in that case, conscientious examination of the truth of the 
premises is problematic. Such examination at once raises nasty 
problems, and not just concerning their truth, but also their 
specification. What are the circumstances and the characteristics 
in the major premise? Can they be listed? Would not listing them 
require answering the question “When does adoption work?” And if 
that answer takes the form “It depends on the child and his or her 
circumstances, and on the adoptive family and their 
circumstances, and on the local services to support the adoption 
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and their circumstances”, then doesn’t that mean that to give 
content to the first premise you have to go to the second one? If 
all we can say is that adoption works if it suits the child, then 
deduction gets us nowhere. We are then just back in the difficulty 
we had before – that we don’t know what should come into 
deciding on what has to be true to support an adoption decision.  
Fourth, the paucity of cases where proof-like procedures are 
valuable or useful does not mean that there are no ways of looking 
critically at what you are doing, either as you go along or 
afterwards if things have gone wrong. Absence of proof does not 
mean absence of reasons, good reasons. To take a real example, 
the (unpublished) Serious Case Review of the serious injury of a 
baby concludes that: 
• The view of the social worker that the child’s injuries might 
have been caused by the babysitter was mistaken. 
• The mistake arose because an early cue – the limited content 
of a phone call from a police officer after she had interviewed the 
mother and partner – strongly suggested the plausible narrative 
that the mother and boyfriend were not implicated, a narrative 
which survived without challenge despite later cues casting doubt 
on it. 
• This particular mistake can usefully be seen as an example of a 
type, that is, “Garden Path errors” (that is, where an initial piece 
of information sets the practitioner’s thinking off in the wrong 
direction – ‘up the garden path’).  
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• The bias in how new evidence is interpreted in Garden Path 
cases leads to the initial assessment not only going unchallenged 
but being gradually held with more confidence. 
• The chances of this kind of error occurring can be reduced if 
someone new looks at the evidence and sees possible alternative 
assessments (differential diagnosis). 
• There should therefore be a central place for mechanisms that 
enable review of judgements and decisions by other people.  
 
This example shows that it is possible to provide criteria or 
questions to assess how a process goes wrong (through Garden 
Path error) and how that might be avoided (by differential 
diagnosis) through what arrangements (requiring a second 
opinion). It does not show, because it cannot be shown, when you 
are being led up the garden path, nor how to differentially 
diagnose. Nor can it tell you when these are possibilities to which 
you should pay special attention. 
Fifth, absence of proof-like objectivity does not mean that any 
answer is as good as any other. The detective who cannot produce 
a Poirot moment in the drawing room, with every loose end tidied 
up, nevertheless can solve the case. How he does so is by 
constructing a story which meets the deliberation tests of a 
coherent narrative that is fairly consistent, covers most of the 
relevant information and is plausible (that is, it hangs together and 
portrays the characters in a coherent, believable manner). Looking 
just for consistency and plausibility is, as we have pointed out, 
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unnecessary or incomprehensible in the case of questioning the 
conclusion of a deductive syllogism. The survival of loose ends 
does not mean that you cannot have an account that meets the 
“beyond reasonable doubt” and “balance of probabilities” tests 
applied in court. Those tests are precisely to distinguish one 
narrative from another. As many defendants know to their cost, it 
is not true that in court anything goes, that any story is as good as 
any other. 
Sixth, coherence and plausibility are important features of a good 
narrative, but they are not enough. We have to distinguish the 
kind of narrative we need from a thoroughly coherent and 
plausible novel about things that never happened. The difference 
is that our narratives have to be anchored to the world. This is 
done at several levels, from very specific facts to very general 
theories, and much in between. Facts and theories have to have 
good support. What support you need varies according to what 
you need to support. It includes simple observation for brute facts 
and statistical analysis for general theories (to give just some 
examples).  
Seventh, decisions in child welfare use concepts which have been 
developed by people or by society. They are in that sense 
constructs, not naturally occurring features of the world like rocks, 
which existed before and no doubt after any society. Some see 
this as undermining their objectivity, but being socially constructed 
does not mean that we cannot, with any certainty, say that this or 
that situation does or does not exemplify them. There is no doubt 
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in very many cases that two people are married, even though 
marriage is a construct.  
Eighth, it is not a defect that a decision is based on the skills and 
experience of a particular practitioner and is, in that sense, 
personal. As soon as you abandon the idea of the possibility and 
desirability of proof-like and rules based procedures, then the 
alternative – deliberation by particular people in particular 
circumstances – is not a second best but the right, the only way of 
proceeding, which fits the problem at hand. Practitioners quite 
rightly bring their own personal skills and knowledge to the work. 
Yet, this does not mean that their judgements are personal in the 
sense of prejudice or mere whim. When a practitioner approaches 
a problem, he or she sees it not as an isolated matter, but locates 
it in a wider context of understanding of the world in order to 
make sense of it. 
We expect that practitioners will leave some of their baggage at 
the door – their prejudices and career prospects for example, 
things that might affect their judgements adversely. But they 
cannot and should not leave everything behind. If objectivity 
means forgetting what you have learned about making sense of 
this kind of world, it becomes a mad version of approaching a 
problem with a blank, empty mind. 
What practitioners bring to solving problems is their experience – 
and imagination based on that experience – to get into the debate 
whatever is needed to make a good decision. That includes brute 
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facts (such as that the house is cold), facts involving socially 
constructed concepts (that the child has been abused), theory and 
generalizations (that adoption rarely works in these 
circumstances), pattern recognition and everything else that is 
needed if we are to have a narrative that meets the deliberation 
tests. It is plain that this requires imagination and creativity 
disciplined by realism. It is also plain that if we limit ourselves to 
procedures that fit the objectivity criteria of being proof-like, 
systematic, etc., then many of the ways in which people 
successfully use their imagination and creativity will be excluded. 
That is why so called objective procedures cannot be the gold 
standard of how we are to work.  
If this is so (and we believe that it is), what kinds of experts are 
child welfare practitioners? How do they carry out their 
professional role? How should they approach their tasks – 
deliberate and make decisions on particular cases – in combination 
with other professional figures (other experts)? How can they do 
their job well, or get better at what they do? We will question the 
issue of how to relate deliberation to expertise in the following 
section.  
Deliberating as an expert 
Being able to deliberate well is an essential, constitutive trait of 
expertise. How then do we develop expertise in a given field of 
inquiry that puts us at an advantage when we come to deliberate 
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on issues there? Some insights are available from the literature on 
the conditions and contexts under which expertise is developed.  
First, let us consider how types of expertise can differ. Compare a 
skilled rafter going down the rapids avoiding one potential calamity 
after another and two creative students in the computer science 
department at Stanford University who come up with a superior 
way of searching for information on the internet (i.e. Google). As 
Kahneman (2011) points out, both are taking risks, both have, to 
some extent, been lucky, but experience has undoubtedly helped 
the rafter and not the students.  
The same can be said of firefighters. Klein (2000) found that 
expert firefighters did not consider a range of options, or even two 
alternatives but, in the urgency of tackling a blaze, usually 
generated just one hypothesis to guide their actions. He concluded 
that, through experience they developed a repertoire of patterns 
of how fires behaved and from this they identified a plausible 
option that they considered first. They did not just act on this, 
they tested it by mentally simulating whether it would work in the 
situation they were facing, taking action if it still looked plausible, 
generating another option if it did not and subsequently checking 
how emerging information fitted the hypothesis they were working 
under.  
An expert in child welfare is more like the rafter and the firefighter 
than the Stanford students. Experience is valuable and can lead to 
improved expertise. What counts as “experience” in the context of 
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child welfare? The social worker who has worked with numerous 
parents who are neglecting their children develops a depth of 
understanding and a range of skills for engaging with the parents, 
motivating and helping them to tackle their poor parenting.  
The “pattern recognition” type of decision-making used by the 
firefighters is also relevant in the context of child welfare, as has 
also been found to be in many areas of expert practice. It is 
theorized to be effective because it takes advantage of experts’ 
tacit knowledge (Klein, Calderwood and Clinton-Cirocco 1986), 
that is that body of skills, ideas and experiences not easily 
expressible, often not codified, and yet crucial in forming a 
judgement or reaching a decision. It is of course a fallible type of 
knowledge, and much work has been done to identify when and 
why experts make mistakes.  
A central aim in this body of research is to study how people make 
decisions in real-life situations, to describe decision-making 
(“naturalistic-decision making”) and to demystify intuition, 
identifying the cues that experts use to make their judgements. 
The other set of research on biases of intuitive reasoning, referred 
to earlier, takes a different approach and, drawing on probability 
theory, aims to prescribe how best to make decisions. Researchers 
here are generally more sceptical of expert judgement, comparing 
it with the outcome that would result from a formal use of 
probability calculus. Meehl’s review of studies (1986) that 
compared predictions made by experts with those predicted by 
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simple statistical models (actuarial tools) claims that statistical 
models outperformed experts in almost every case of the kinds 
studied. Kahneman and others have since studied expert 
judgements in great detail and identified the biases cited earlier in 
this chapter. 
These two sets of research appear to produce conflicting findings. 
This led two key leaders from each group to come together to 
discuss how and why they differed. This resulted in an article titled 
‘Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree’ 
(Kahneman & Klein 2009) where, instead of simply disagreeing, 
the authors lay out the conditions under which they think 
competent expert judgement could be acquired and when they 
think more formal methods are needed.  
The first criterion identified by Kahneman and Klein is that ‘the 
environment must provide sufficiently valid cues about the nature 
of the situation you are facing’. Skilled intuitions will only develop 
if there is sufficient regularity in the environment so that people 
can identify recurrent patterns of activity. Buildings on fire act in 
sufficiently regular ways for expertise to develop – though with 
numerous variations depending on the type of building, availability 
of flammable materials, etc. – so that many different patterns of 
how they progress may be learned.  
To what extent does the environment of child welfare provide 
sufficient regularity? This is not an easy question to answer. 
However, one can speculate that there will be big differences 
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between aspects that are frequently encountered and those that 
are rare. In the case study of Doris and Ron presented earlier, for 
example, the social worker was informed by her knowledge of the 
patterns of cleanliness and tidiness in family homes when she felt 
uneasy about the pattern she was observing in this case. There 
are also many other scenarios where any one practitioner is 
unlikely to see enough instances to form competent intuitive 
judgements. Post-natal depression is fairly common but no one 
health visitor is likely to see many cases where this escalates to 
killing the baby. If there are any cues that distinguish the 
potentially lethal from the less dangerous, they are more likely to 
be identified by large-scale factor analysis of cases than by 
individual social workers. It may, of course, be the case that the 
environment is so irregular that it is impossible to identify 
sufficiently valid cues to learn patterns and make accurate 
predictions. Actuarial tools to predict child maltreatment in the 
general population produce such high levels of false positives and 
false negatives that they have limited practical value (see, e.g., 
Peters and Barlow 2003). 
The second criterion identified by Kahneman and Klein is that 
‘people must have the opportunity, and the time, to learn how to 
develop expertise’. This means that people need feedback about 
what happened when they acted on their intuitive judgement. 
Some situations provide instant feedback. The professional seeking 
to calm a frightened child will get swift feedback on whether their 
choice of body language and words has been helpful or not. Many 
of the big decisions in child welfare, however, need follow up to 
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find out whether the decision was good or not. The intake workers 
who decide whether a case looks worrying enough to need a full 
child protection investigation cannot develop expertise in making 
this decision if they never learn what happened to those cases in 
later weeks or months. When there is continuity of working with a 
family then there is greater opportunity for learning, otherwise 
organisations need to create mechanisms to provide feedback for 
learning to take place.  
Time is essential for learning to occur. Professionals who hurry 
from one task to another without time to reflect on what they are 
observing have limited capacity for learning. Time is also needed 
because acquiring expertise in a given domain does not involve a 
single skill, but rather a large collection of mini skills including, we 
add, the skill of combining the different skills. Just like an expert 
player who can get at a glance a complex position on the chess 
board only after years of developing that ability, the child welfare 
worker can develop a sense of the complex and nuanced 
atmosphere of the family home. 
Prolonged practice gives experts not only the time to learn what is 
required to be an expert but also makes them aware of the limits 
of any expertise. No amount of expertise can give us complete 
confidence that we are right about something, or that we can 
recommend the right course of action. The probability of our belief 
can increase, though, when the two criteria of a relatively stable 
environment and prolonged practice apply.  
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There are a number of ways in which people can improve their 
deliberations. We have already talked about the role of emotions 
and the cognitive biases that affect intuitive reasoning. While there 
is no guaranteed way to eliminate any distortions arising from 
them, it is possible to reduce the risk of error.  
So, back to the question posed at the beginning of this section: 
how does expertise help a professional deliberate well or better? 
Box 2.8 summarizes our answer to this question. 
Box 2.8 Deliberation, wisdom and expertise 
 
In deliberating we aim at judgements that not only display 
knowledge but also, and more relevantly, point us in the 
direction of ‘knowing the right thing to do, at the right time, 
in the right way, and for the right reason’, as discussed by 
Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics. 
Knowing what is right (in the circumstances) is different from 
being knowledgeable in a disciplinary field. It is a form of 
wisdom.  
 
An expert is someone who not only has knowledge of a 
certain area but is also able to use that knowledge to say the 
right thing, or recommend the right course of action, about 
something that falls within his area of expertise. (Montuschi, 
2017 forthcoming) 
 
He or she is good at “putting it all together” in a usable way. 
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One final issue: how “objective” can expert deliberations be? How 
trustworthy can they be? If we go back to the features of 
objectivity as often understood, and challenged by us in the 
previous section (systematic or rule-based, proof-like, impersonal 
and transparent), we see that they hardly apply to expert 
judgement. This, however, says more about a concept of 
objectivity based on those features than about how much trust we 
can put on expert judgement. For example, the alternative to 
“being impersonal” is not necessarily “being personal” in the sense 
of being subjective, arbitrary, biased, etc. It could rather be “being 
the right person for the decision problem”, in the sense of “right” 
suggested above. No ideals of objectivity can teach us to be that 
person! To be right is a practical achievement – and so is the type 
of objectivity that we can attach to practical deliberations. 
(Montuschi 2016) 
Conclusion 
This chapter has covered many issues. It began with a detailed 
account of the varied ways by which people make sense of the 
world through conscious and unconscious processes that are 
influenced by their emotional responses to experience. It discussed 
how such sense making appears in the context of professional 
practice and illustrated how this was both complicated, drawing on 
a wide range of types of information, and imprecise, following no 
prescribed method that ensures everyone will reach the same 
conclusion.  
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This lack of precision causes discomfort, and those who seek 
“objectivity” seem to want an alternative that provides a 
systematic, proof-like, impersonal and transparent process. We 
argued that this was not a feasible option because the human 
contexts in which we are interested in child welfare services are 
not just complicated but complex, so that precise and accurate 
blueprints are not available.  
The absence of proof does not mean the absence of good reasons 
and good reasoning: abandoning the ambition of ideal objectivity 
does not mean embracing unbridled subjectivity. The results of 
deliberation can be appraised according to their plausibility, how 
well they cover the known facts and, sometimes, we can make 
predictions of what else should be the case if this account is 
correct, and so find additional support. In the process of 
deliberating, drawing on findings from empirical research is one 
valuable source of support. Moreover, expertise in deliberating in a 
subject area can be improved through experience, learning and 
constructive, critical dialogue with colleagues. 
In the next and final chapter of this book, we shall draw together 
what has been said about causality and deliberation to bring out 
its implications for the role of research in improving welfare 
services to children and their families.  
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CONCLUSION 
We are arguing for the essential role of individual human skill in 
engaging with the complexity of the world and the tasks of 
understanding and helping families. This includes a radically 
different picture of where research fits into child welfare work from 
the currently dominant picture. The complexity of the social world 
means that there are severe limitations to how much we can 
develop general conclusions about what works in helping parents 
provide better and safer care for children and young people. 
Research should be seen as a valuable resource but it needs to be 
read critically, paying attention to negative as well as positive 
findings and reflecting on the extent to which its context 
resembles your own. Even when it looks a good bet that it might 
be helpful in your context, implementation needs to be monitored 
to see how it is interacting with the numerous other causal 
processes already operating or that may come up later in the 
process, perhaps producing unexpected results. 
At the same time, more attention needs to be given to the key role 
of deliberation in deciding what to do to help families. By its 
nature, deliberation cannot be turned into a formalized, 
deterministic process where there is one clearly “right” conclusion, 
but it can be done to varying standards. A better appreciation of 
how we reason provides guidance on how organisations can 
enhance the deliberative skills of their workforce. One factor is 
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giving time for the task, i.e. recognizing its importance. Another is 
that openness about one’s thinking allows others to challenge and 
support the process, reducing the risk of individual bias or limited 
experience.   
The simplistic version of EBPP that we have been critiquing is not 
held by all. Indeed, most researchers would, we think, not endorse 
it explicitly. It is, however, implicit in the dominant narrative in the 
world of politics and policymaking, where references to “what 
works” are made as if the findings of an RCT can be readily 
generalized. Moreover, within this narrative, there is a trend to 
overlooking the part of the original EBPP that saw research 
evidence being weighed up with the professionals’ local knowledge 
and the user’s views and values. Increasingly, there is reference to 
evidence-based practices – in the plural – and not to evidence-
based practice.  
This shift to EBPPs can be seen as fitting EBPP into the 
‘technocratic culture in children’s services’ (Hood 2014), a longer 
term trend of seeking to treat family problems as amenable to a 
techno-rational approach where the moral dimension of interfering 
in people’s private lives is pushed into the background. Recent 
decades have seen strategies for improving services taking the 
form of seeking to proceduralise them and reduce the role of 
individual expertise, with form filling and box-ticking becoming 
dominant. The Munro Review argued that this leads to services 
giving insufficient time and skill to helping families solve problems, 
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and also that it fails to provide the requisite variety to meet the 
range of needs that professionals address.  
Deliberative skills have been our main focus. These draw on all the 
human skills of intuitive learning, emotional responses and 
imagination as well as logical thinking. In making the case, we 
have drawn upon research findings for support. The current 
understanding of how we reason emphasizes the importance of 
emotion and intuition, challenging the assumption that logical 
reasoning is “the best” and to be aspired to in all circumstances. 
Deliberative skills are not second best to logic but the best for the 
tasks professionals face in child welfare services.  Research on the 
effectiveness of interventions has also highlighted the limits of 
what can be written out in manuals and the necessary role of 
individual expertise in understanding and working with families. 
Unless organisations give due attention to creating and 
maintaining a skilled workforce, the value contained in manualised 
interventions will fail to be realized in practice.  
The moral dimension of child welfare work is also important to 
consider. There is a moral dimension to using research: Gambrill 
has made an eloquent case for claiming that it is unethical to 
ignore research findings on effectiveness when deciding how to 
help a child or family (Gambrill 2010). But she has also highlighted 
the ways that EBPP can be conducted unethically (Gambrill 2012). 
First, there is the widely known problem of publication bias. 
Studies that have positive results are more likely to be published 
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than those with negative, or non-significant, findings. Yet negative 
findings, although disappointing to those who hoped they had 
found a way to help children, are just as informative to 
professionals, giving them suggestions of what to avoid doing.  
Second, there is a problem that, within reported studies, more 
attention is given to positive rather than negative findings. This 
bias is then carried through to discussions on what to do, with the 
dominant question being “What works?” rather than “How much 
harm might this do?” In a review of published reviews of evidence-
based practices, Littell noted that ‘most reviews used a single 
positive statement to characterize results of a study that were 
decidedly mixed’ (Littell 2008). Yet there is plenty of evidence that 
when professionals intervene in people’s lives, however good their 
intentions, they can do harm.  
Another major ethical issue in child welfare is users’ consent. In 
many cases where significant harm from maltreatment is involved, 
parents and children do not have the freedom to consent to the 
involvement of professionals in their lives. However, even within 
this coerced group, there is scope for seeking their views on how 
problems should be tackled.  Those in the helping professions are 
aware that they deal disproportionately with the disempowered 
members of society: poor and ethnic minority families are over-
represented in those known to child welfare services. Instead of 
taking advantage of the clear power difference between them, 
however, professionals typically aspire to practice in a way that 
empowers services users. To this end, it is crucial to pay attention 
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to the element of EBPP that includes giving due weight to the 
views and preferences of those who will receive the intervention. 
If services users are to be helped to give informed consent then 
they need to be given a full account of what is known about the 
likely and possible effects of the proposed course of action, rather 
than just being assured that “it works”. In medicine, we are all 
used to the leaflets that come with any drugs telling us of both the 
common and the infrequent side effects that have been reported 
so that we are well informed when deciding to take the drug. 
However, there are at present no equivalent health warnings with 
social interventions, though there are no grounds for complacently 
believing that only good or neutral effects result from professional 
interventions.   
There are several criticisms that are likely to be made of our 
account. It fails to offer the kind of “objectivity” that many want to 
achieve. However, we have critiqued the idea of objectivity as 
typically understood and argued that there is no infallible way of 
being right about the future and no procedure that, through being 
systematic, impersonal, proof-like and transparent, will guarantee 
a good decision. The apparent “objectivity” of, for example, 
procedures or risk assessment tools evaporates on closer study. 
Some want more rules and procedures because it reduces the 
element of individual power and hence of individual responsibility. 
Child welfare work is an area where tragic outcomes can occur and 
we live in a society where a high level of criticism can be targeted 
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at professionals who are seen, with hindsight, to have failed to 
protect children. The defence of having followed due process can 
be seen as a way of protecting oneself against attack. However, 
not only has this defence failed in high profile cases of child deaths 
(e.g. in the media reactions to the death of Peter Connolly (Warner 
2015), but it can only be achieved by standardizing work to an 
extent such that it then fails to meet the variety of needs child 
protection encounters.  
Many will argue that we are making the whole process so 
complicated as to be impractical. There is a merit in making 
research as simple to access, interpret and use as possible since 
professionals have very busy lives. There are limits, however, to 
how much this can be done. People have turned to scientific 
methods because their rigour gives us greater confidence in the 
conclusions. If we lose that rigour through a wish to simplify 
results, we lose the benefits of science. To repeat, a chain is only 
as strong as its weakest link, so cutting corners in drawing on 
research will undermine the enterprise.  
We would also argue that our view of the world as complex is very 
familiar to those involved in direct work with families. Many 
professionals have been critical of the tendency to devalue their 
expertise and try to turn professional practice into a more 
mechanical process. Its limits are very visible to those who see the 
variety of the needs and circumstances of children and young 
people. Research on professionals’ views of EBPP found that many 
were opposed because they questioned its ability to deal with the 
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complex reality that they faced (Gray et al. 2013). Therefore, the 
reactions to our arguments may be very different in different 
communities within child welfare, just as current attitudes to EBPP 
are varied. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1. WEBSITES 
You may find it helpful to consult the following websites that 
evaluate and summarise research on intervention effectiveness in 
child welfare. 
• The Campbell Collaboration is an international organization 
that produces and disseminates systematic reviews of welfare 
interventions. Its stated mission is to help ‘people make well-
informed decisions by preparing, maintaining, and 
disseminating systematic reviews in education, crime and 
justice, and social welfare’: www.campbellcollaboration.org 
• The Child Welfare Information Gateway from the US 
Department of Human and Health Services lists currently 
evidenced interventions for prevention of problematic 
development, including preventing maltreatment: 
www.childwelfare.gov  
• Prevent Child Abuse is a US foundation providing relevant 
research. It ‘recognizes the significance of research to inform 
the public at-large and specifically, practitioners and 
consumers of prevention programming’: 
www.preventchildabuse.org   
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• The California Evidence-Based Clearinghouse for Child 
Welfare states that its mission is ‘to advance the effective 
implementation of evidence-based practices for children and 
families involved with the child welfare system. The primary 
goal […] is to provide a searchable database of programs that 
can be utilized by professionals that serve children and 
families involved with the child welfare system’: 
www.cebc4cw.org 
• The Canadian Child Welfare Research Portal ‘summarises 
recently published child welfare studies that have been 
conducted in Canada’: www.cwrp.ca  
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention based in the 
US provide summaries of and links to effective and promising 
programmes and background materials on prevalence and 
consequences of maltreatment of children: 
www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/childmaltreatment/index.html 
• The Early Intervention Foundation (UK) describes itself as 
‘the “go-to” organisation for evidence and advice on Early 
Intervention. [They] assess the evidence of what works, to 
determine the best Early Interventions available and their 
relative value for money’. The EIF provides an interactive 
guidebook to find evidence and guidance on how to deliver 
effective early interventions: www.guidebook.eif.org.uk 
• The Washington State Institute for Public Policy (Child 
welfare section) provides a resume of the return on 
investment of various interventions entitled: ‘An updated 
Inventory of Evidence-based, Research-based, and Promising 
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Practices for Prevention and Intervention Services for Children 
and Juveniles in the Child Welfare, Juvenile Justice, and Mental 
Health Systems’: www.wsipp.wa.gov 
• The Centre for Excellence and Outcomes in Children and 
Young People's Services (C4EO) works with local areas and 
services in the UK (across the public, private, voluntary and 
community sectors) to gather examples of excellent local 
practice which has led to significantly improved outcomes for 
children, young people and their families. Examples are 
assessed by a panel of sector experts who consider them 
against robust criteria, including the ability for other local 
areas to implement and use this “best” practice: 
www.c4eo.org.uk 
  
  
Appendix 2: More kinds of causal maps 
This appendix helps you to construct more complicated causal 
maps. You can use these maps in different ways. These ways are 
complementary and are often used in sequence. First, as you are 
trying to formulate a detailed assessment of a family’s functioning 
you want to understand what factors in the family and 
environment are producing what results. Second, you want the 
causal map because knowing about the causes of a bad result and 
how they are acting together to produce it can help you identify 
effective ways to intervene and effective points at which to do so. 
Third, mapping out important facts about how a proposed 
intervention should work and what is in place that can help and 
hinder it will help you make better predictions about the outcomes 
of your interventions. And finally, an even more open-ended job, 
you want to envisage what might change in the future that might 
bring the child into danger – like the violent partner of the mother 
moving back in.  
The different kinds of causal maps we describe in Chapter 1 have 
different advantages. The cake diagram highlights support factors 
but it does not represent anything about how the causal process 
unfolds step-by-step, which is information that can be very helpful 
for figuring out where to intervene or at what points the linkages 
you need for your intervention to work may be weak. On the other 
hand, you cannot read off from a process graph or a causal loop 
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diagram of the kind we pictured what the support factors are for 
the salient features pictured at each step. Here we borrow ideas 
from a training manual for mental health practitioners (Layne et 
al. 2014) to show how you can build up a causal map that 
represents both kinds of information at once.  
It is important to keep in mind that these are just ways of 
representing information that can be important to the outcomes 
you are concerned about. They are not ways to discover this 
information but reminders of the kinds of things it may matter to 
discover. And they are certainly not meant to be treated like boxes 
that you must fill in: filling them in is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to getting good predictions. They are meant as an aid to 
help you think through the details of the causal narrative of what 
is happening to the family and child, and how, or what would 
happen, and how, were you too undertake the action you 
envisage. 
Let’s build up bit by bit, adding detail as we proceed. You may find 
you can make do with some of the simpler maps for some cases 
but want to use the more complicated ones for others.  
You are already familiar with cake maps. Each cake depicts a 
complex of factors that together are enough to make it likely that 
a contribution to the outcome will occur. For almost all causes or 
interventions, there will be many different cakes containing the 
same factors but with different mixes of support factors that can 
contribute to the outcome. This neglects the fact that an 
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intervention can generally require other factors to be in place if it 
is to contribute to the outcome, but there may be more than one 
such set of support factors that can do the job. Some of these will 
contribute to boosting the effect. Let’s label these with a plus sign: 
+. Other clusters of factors, other cakes, will diminish the effect. 
Label these with a minus sign: -. For visual clarity it helps to 
gather the positive factors in one clump and the negative in 
another. As in Figure A.1, in which we have coloured the factor 
which is the salient cause, and often the policy intervention you 
are focussing on, in grey. 
 
Figure A.1 
-
-
+
++
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So here the grey factor, the intervention, boosts the effect when it 
is combined with the other factors in the (top) cake (on the right 
hand side); and/or with the (different set of) factors in the middle 
cake: and/or (with yet another set of) factors in the left-hand side. 
Similarly, it has a diminishing effect in the cakes on the bottom. 
This makes sense: parenting classes are good if they are combined 
with the right set of complementary factors in any one of the three 
cakes. But are not so good if parents are unmotivated or the 
teacher is untrained.  
If you are considering the effects of just a single salient factor – 
like a particular intervention – you need to represent only cakes 
that contain that factor. But if you are trying to understand a fuller 
story of what is bringing about a result, say the bad situation you 
are worried about, you will need to try to fill in as many of the 
causal cakes as possible and that includes cakes in which the 
salient factor is not the one you first thought of. 
That is one kind of causal diagram you might use to organize your 
thinking. Another is to recognize that typically there are many 
significant stages that occur between the initial causes and the 
final outcome. As in our step-by-step strategy above, it can be 
helpful to think through what they are. For instance, you may see 
no way to remove an initial deleterious cause. Still you may be 
able to prevent it contributing to the effect by blocking one of the 
stages in between. We’ve illustrated step-by-step already in Figure 
1.5. But with an eye to the further complications to be added, you 
might picture it like the one in Figure A.2. 
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Figure A.2 
This map depicts one single factor, the salient factor, after 
another. But the cake story says that one single factor, even the 
salient one, will seldom be enough on its own to make the next 
effect likely. It is just one ingredient – one wedge – in a causal 
cake. In Figure A.1 we showed the salient factor as a member of a 
number of cakes, some good some bad, in combination with a 
variety of other factors. And so too the salient factor at each stage 
in Figure A.2 is almost always a member of a number of cakes 
good and bad. That means that you can combine the ideas of 
Figures A.1 and A.2 to make a causal map with yet more 
information pictured. You just add the cakes relevant to each 
wedge at each step, as we depict in Figure A.3. Recalling that 
some cakes will promote the effect and others inhibit it, we put the 
promoters on top, with plus signs and the inhibitors on the 
bottom, with minus signs, as before. If a step is to lead to the next 
step, then at least one good cake must be effective, i.e. the 
supporting factors in it must be present, and if more than one cake 
is complete and thus effective, then the overall effect of the 
effective good and bad cakes must be positive. If this doesn’t hold 
at each step, you don’t get to the end. As in a quick exit tree, 
though the exit here need not be quick, i.e. early on. 
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Figure A.3 
Figure A.3 shows one pathway, beginning with one salient factor, 
that can lead to the outcome in question so long as the right 
combinations of support factors, pictured in the different causal 
cakes, obtain at each step. It is already fairly complicated because 
it depicts the different causal cakes that can be relevant at each 
step. Still it leaves out much of the causal story because it depicts 
only that one pathway, starting with that one salient factor. But 
recall our worries in Step-by-step that an intervention that is 
capable of making a positive difference might be derailed or 
overwhelmed by the action of other causes. This is not an unusual 
occurrence. In general, there will be many different step-by-step 
pathways feeding into the same outcome, some with different 
salient factors at the start but some will have the same salient 
factor at their head since even the same starting factor can get to 
the end effect by different series of steps in between (see Figure 
A.4).  
--
+
- -
+ ++
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This matters directly for diagnosis, when you want to figure out 
how a bad outcome is coming about. But it also matters for 
predicting the effects of treatment interventions, for a couple of 
different reasons. Knowing what else will affect the outcome in 
question will help you figure out how much improvement you can 
expect from what you propose to do. Also it may be that one of 
the other pathways into the outcome will contain factors that will 
break one of the arrows in the path that would lead from your 
intervention to the improvement aimed for so that your 
intervention won’t have its desired effect after all. 
 
Figure A.4 
+
+
-
+
-
-
- +
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These causal maps are to remind you what kinds of information 
you need to think about to make successful predictions or accurate 
diagnoses. You of course will never be able to fill them in very 
fully. But you don’t always have to. Causal chains are like any 
other chains: they are only as strong as their weakest link. So, 
watch especially for places where the arrows may get broken (see 
box A.1). A broken arrow between your intervention and the 
outcome will mean that you will not get the effect you are aiming 
for, at least not along that pathway.  
 
Box A.1 A causal chain is only as strong as its 
weakest link. 
So watch for places where the pathway from starting cause 
to final outcome may get broken. This can help both in 
finding points at which to intervene and in predicting the 
effects of your proposed intervention. 
 
There are two ways the arrow may be broken. Something 
positively steps in to stop it or some essential support factor is 
missing. Recognizing this will help you make better predictions 
about the effects of the particular intervention you propose. It is 
also helpful when you are trying to find effective ways to 
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intervene. If you can break any arrow, that pathway to the bad 
outcome will be blocked.  
But be careful. There may well be many pathways all of which 
contribute to the undesirable outcome, in which case blocking one 
may not make for much improvement. Also you need to be sure 
that by blocking one pathway to the negative outcome, you don’t 
open new negative pathways. We’ve seen an example of just this 
in the loop diagram of Figure 1.9. Stricter guidelines and more 
careful monitoring were supposed to stop delays and a too-casual 
analysis of the problem and thus improve child welfare outcomes. 
But the interventions also created new pathways that worked for 
just the opposite effect.  
Beyond these kinds of maps you can clearly proceed even further, 
depending on how fully you want to represent your causal 
narrative. You can for instance add cakes to a loop diagram or 
steps between wedges and outcomes to a diagram showing 
multiple wedges with directed cakes. Generally, the more detail 
you can fill in, the better grasp you will have of the overall causal 
picture. But starting out with the idea that you need to fill in some 
template for one of these complicated diagrams can be daunting. 
It can inhibit rather than encourage your thinking about what is 
going on with the children and their family. So it is probably best 
to start with simple cake diagrams or try to think through what is 
happening, or what will happen, step-by-step – and always 
endeavouring to review your hypotheses with others and to 
monitor that matters are going as expected. 
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